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The present privileged trade relations between the former colonies in
Sub-Saharan Africa, the Caribbeans and the Pacific archipelago (ACP
countries) on the one hand and the European Community (EC) on the
other are based on a long tradition.
They superseded
- reciprocal preferential trading arrangements negotiated between the
founder states of the EC and their former colonies mainly the franco-
phone Sub-Saharan African countries in the two Yaounde agreements of
1963 and 1969,
- an arrangement of the Yaounde type with the three East African coun- *•
tries Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, the so-called Arusha arrangement
of 1969,
- the Commonwealth preferences conceded by the UK in favour of all
member developing countries of the Commonwealth and
- some other bilateral arrangements such as that between the EC and the
former Dutch colonies in the Caribbean.
The merger of these arrangements in the three so-called Lome conven-
tions or ACP agreements of 1975, 1979, and 1984 (1) did not mean only a
change in quantitative terms as the number of privileged countries is
now larger, but it amounts also to a qualitative change. In contrast to
the former agreements cited above, the developing countries have now
not to grant counterconcessions for imports from the EC members. Fur-
thermore, the scope of cooperation is much more far-reaching than be-
fore comprising financial aid flows, technical assistance and export sta-
bilization schemes (Stabex) (2). Yet, an open market for the large ma-
jority of tariff items remains the core of EC concessions, though the
associates themselves seem to have given a higher priority to aid flows
in the recent Lome III negotiations.
This shift in priorities may reflect disappointment on the meagre trade
effects of tariff concessions. Strong empirical evidence for the ineffec-
tiveness of the preferences is given in Chapter II where losses of ACP
countries in world markets as well as in EC markets are documented.
These disappointments form the background of this study which provides
evidence and reasons of barriers to success of these concessions. These
barriers might have been "imported" as a result of EC trade policies or
they- may be "natural" and exogenous in the sense that poor infrastruc-
ture, climatic disasters and oil price shocks have prevented the as-
sociates from using all options of the preferences. The relevance of
these arguments in favour of "natural" barriers is discussed in
(1) Contracting partner of the ACP countries in the Lome conventions is
the European Economic Community, hereinafter referred to as the
EC.
(2) History and implementation of other than trade provisions of the
Lome conventions do not fall within the realm of this study. For a
recent comprehensive survey see Moss [1982]; Stevens [1984];
Kibola [1984].Chapter III. Another reason for failure of preferences could be the EC
preferential trade policy itself. Either by exempting potentially important
ACP exports from preferential treatment or by granting non-ACP devel-
oping countries the same treatment, the EC may have contributed to
weaken trade-creating and trade-diverting effects. Chapter IV presents
an analysis of such elements of restriction and erosion in the EC trade
policy towards ACP countries.
The ineffectiveness of preferences may have its roots not only on the
demand side but also on the supply side. As such it can be the result of
policies in the developing countries themselves which penalised exports
in favour of local sales and rendered domestic production factors incom-
petitive in terms of international prices. Disincentives to exports by
distorted goods and factor prices or by mismanagement of governments
are analysed in detail in Chapter V.
Finally, explanations are given for an insufficient flow of foreign direct
investment (FDI) which embodies technical, commercial and managerial
know-how needed very much by ACP countries for their economic devel-
opment (Chapter VI).II. Past Trends in ACP Country Trade
1. ACP Countries in World Exports
a. Overall Pattern
The ACP group though comprising a large and increasing number of
countries holds a very small share in world trade as shown in Table Al.
Between 1970 and 1982 this share fluctuated between 2.9 and 2.5 per
cent with a peak of 3.1 per cent in 1975 and is mainly determined by
Nigeria. If this country, which is the biggest oil producer and exporter
in the ACP group, is excluded, it becomes obvious that the share of
total exports of the remaining countries in world exports has been
steadily receding. It went down from 2.5 per cent in 1970 to 2.1 per
cent in 1975 and further to 1.6 per cent in 1982. In 1970, about four
fifths of the total exports from ACP countries came from African members
and it is their share which is primarily responsible for the decline in the
total ACP share in world exports. The African exports went down from
2.4 per cent of world exports (1970) to 2 per cent (1982) in spite of the
fact that Nigeria was able to more than double its share during this pe-
riod accounting for more than two fifths of total exports from African
members. Countries which mainly account for the decline in the African
share are Ghana, Senegal, Sudan, Uganda, Zaire and Zambia, but also
the Ivory Coast and Kenya, the two often cited African success stories.
Gains in shares like those of Cameroon, Congo, Gabon, Guinea, Niger
and Zimbabwe could not outweigh the losses.
The share of Caribbean members increased between 1970 and 1975 but
then declined. The increase in 1975 was mainly because of the Bahamas
whose share registered a ten fold growth. Since then it has declined
considerably. The total exports of Pacific members account for less than
0.1 per cent of total world exports. Among these countries Papua New
Guinea was able to increase its share in 1975 but later lost the momen-
tum. More than half of the total exports of Pacific members come from
Papua New Guinea. If these exports are excluded, the share of Pacific
members has continuously declined from 1970 to 1982.
b. Commodity Concentration of ACP and World Exports: A Comparison
Exports of individual ACP countries are mostly concentrated in relatively
few commodities. In many cases (Burundi, Congo, Mauritania, Nigeria,
Rwanda, Zambia, Fiji, Tuvalu), the Hirschmann index was measured
above 0.8 in 1980 (Table A2). Only in a few cases (Senegal, Tanzania,
Zimbabwe) it was below 0.3. As compared to ACP countries commodity
concentration indices for EC members clustered around 0.1. Pacific mem-
bers appear to have on an average a higher concentration of their ex-
ports on fewer goods than the African members and these seem to have a
higher concentration than the Caribbean members. On the whole during
the 1970s there has hardly been any improvement in this respect in any
of the three regions. The concentration has rather increased drastically
in some of the countries (Congo, Gabon, Madagascar, Mali, Niger, Nige-
ria, Rwanda and Somalia) during this period. A few exceptions areLiberia, Antigua and Barbuda and St. Lucia who have been able to di-
versify their export structure in the past decade.
A high commodity concentration of exports must, however, not neces-
sarily be harmful for a country. This is so for example if the concen-
tration is in goods enjoying a high world demand. This held for ACP oil
exporters receiving a large income inflow during the 1970s. The majority
of the ACP countries was, however, not in such an enviable position. A'
comparison of their export structure with that of world exports (1) re-
veals a very high deviation suggesting that the goods supplied by these
countries do not represent the bulk of goods exchanged between the
leading trading partners in the world. This is likely to have a negative
impact on their prices and income in most of the cases. The deviation is
on an average higher in the case of Pacific member countries than in the
African countries. In comparison to both of these regions the average of
deviation indices for Caribbean members is lower, although the inter-
regional differences between the three regions are small. To put the
level of deviation into perspective, one may compare the ACP countries
with Ireland which had the highest index (1970: 0.63) in the EC. There
is not a single ACP country which could reach this level in any of the
selected years (Table A2).
c. ACP Performance in Leading Exports of LDCs
There are only three commodities, viz. cocoa, copper and inorganic
chemicals in which ACP countries have leading positions in exports of
less developed countries (LDCs) (Table A3). In these items more than
two fifth of total LDC exports come from these countries. However,
during the seventies they lost some of their markets to other developing
countries. Compared with 1972, their share of total LDC exports in 1980
has decreased in the case of cocoa from 77 to 64 per cent, in copper
from 57 to 40 per cent and in inorganic chemicals from 58 per cent
(1977) to 50 per cent. In cocoa ACP countries are major world suppliers
meeting more than half of the world demand. There is no competition
from developed countries. But in copper and inorganic chemicals devel-
oped countries supply a major portion of world demand and some of the
market shares lost by ACP countries have gone to them.
There are about a dozen commodities in which 20 to 40 per cent of LDC
exports originate or used to originate from ACP countries and as such
are of a great importance for their balance of payments. These are cof-
fee, tobacco, oil seeds, wood (rough), cotton, fertilisers, iron ore and
concentrates, ores and concentrates of non-ferrous base metals, crude
vegetable materials, fixed vegetable oils (soft), pearls and precious and
semi-precious stones. In most of these commodities ACP countries have
been loosing shares in world exports as well as in LDC exports during
the seventies. In some cases it was halved (wood, iron ore, crude vege-
table materials) and some other reduced to one third (oil seeds) or one
fourth (fixed vegetable oils) . The two exceptions are tobacco and pearls
including precious and semi-precious stones. In the latter, there has
(1) For an index constituted for this purpose see Table A2, footnote a.been only a minor change. But in the former, ACP countries have been
able almost to double their share of LCD exports, although much of it
may be due to the accession of Zimbabwe. Other goods worth mentioning
are sugar and tea. The ACP share of sugar has gone down from 12 per
cent (1972) to 7 per cent (1980) of total LDC exports and from 8 to 5
per cent of world exports. The world sugar market is heavily regulated
with high price fluctuations determined mainly by developed countries'
surpluses sold on world markets. The sugar-exporting ACP countries
enjoy purchase guarantees of the EC at guaranteed prices under the
sugar protocol. In economic terms, this guarantee amounts to a product-
tied income transfer to ACP countries without giving impulses to trade
creation through price incentives and corresponding shifts from EC do-
mestic production to imports from ACP countries. In fact, ACP countries
lost their share in spite of the sugar protocol.
The tea market is, however, a stronghold of developing countries and in
this case ACP members have been able to increase their share by about
two percentage points.
2. Regional Trade Pattern of ACP Countries
a. Exports
Table 1 indicates the direction of exports of twenty major ACP countries.
These countries accounted for about four fifth of ACP exports in 1976.
The EC is the most important export market for these countries, al-
though its share in their exports has gone down from 41 per cent in
1976 to 38.5 per cent in 1982 in spite of the intensification and extension
of institutional trade relations following Lome I. However, as non-EC
OECD members have also granted concessions under the Generalized Sys-
tem of Preferences (GSP) like the USA since 1976, and as the Common-
wealth members among the ACP countries enjoyed Commonwealth prefer-
ences until 1978, the Lome I agreement may not have essentially im-
proved market accessibility for them compared with the market accessi-
bility of other markets outside the EC or an EC sub-market.
The change was however not uniform among all the countries. In twelve
countries EC shares decreased and in eight countries they increased.
Among the former, changes in Cameroon, Gabon, Liberia, Madagascar,
Sudan and Zaire were remarkable in the sense that the EC lost more
than 15 percentage points of their total exports. The sample of these
countries reveals that mainly those ACP countries shifted exports to
non-EC destinations for whom the EC had an overproportionate impor-
tance as an export market. In most of the above cases (Cameroon,
Gabon, Liberia, Zaire) more exports were directed to the USA. In Sudan
and Madagascar, however, almost the entire shifting of trade was ac-
counted by the Oil Exporting countries. The increases in EC shares of
ACP exports are more pronounced in Mauritius, Suriname and Trinidad,
and it may be comforting to note that these changes also occured mostly
at the cost of US shares. Nonetheless, the total US share of ACP ex-




































































(a) In per cent of total exports.























































































































































































Algeria, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait,
- (c) Albania,
Poland, USSR. - (d) Afghanistan, Bangladesh,
Kampuchea, Kiribati, Korea, Lao P.D.R., Macao,
Guinea, Philippines, Samoa, Singapore, Solomon

































































































Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, GDR, Mongolia,
, Burma, China, J
Malaysia, Maldives, Nauru,


























































Zaledonia, Pakistan, Papua, New
Tuvalu, Vanuatu, Viet Nam, WesterrI Samoa,
Source: IMF [a; b].Most of the negative changes in EC shares have occurred in African
countries and positive ones in Pacific and Caribbean countries. This may
indicate that transport costs or other trade resistance factors are loosing
some of their importance.
b. Imports
The direction of imports of the twenty major ACP countries is shown in
Table 2. Here, also, it is apparent that the EC is the main trade partner
for these countries supplying more than two-fifths of their total import
demand. EC share in their total import has, however, gone down from
45.6 (1976) to 43.7 per cent (1982). More remarkable is that this decline
was spread over all the importing countries except Ethiopia, Suriname
and Trinidad. Traditionally Ethiopia and Trinidad had non-EC sources
for covering their import demand so that the recent development in fa-
vour of EC suppliers started from a rather low level. Another group of
countries which lost ground in the major ACP markets is OPEC. Its
share suffered a major set back falling from 14.5 (1976) to 7.4 per cent
(1982). Most of it occurred in the case of Ethiopia, Mauritius, Tanzania
and Trinidad. They have been able to reduce their oil imports from
OPEC members as a result of their declining demand and/or increased
supply from domestic and other sources.
Excluding the EC share, imports of the major ACP countries are more
evenly distributed among the different regions than their exports. The
USA absorb about one third of ACP exports occupying the place of the
second biggest market for them. But in the case of imports, the USA
supply only about one tenth of ACP demand. The American share has,
however, increased by 1.3 percentage points between 1976 and 1982. The
highest growth is registered by imports from the Asian countries which
include such good export performers as Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore,
South Korea and Taiwan.
On the whole it may be concluded that EC performance in both imports
and exports of major African associated countries has been poorer than
in other associated countries, though this hypothesis needs a more de-
tailed examination for a final confirmation.
c. Intra-ACP Trade
Intra-ACP exports of 52 reporting ACP countries increased from 1.3
(1976) to 1.8 bill. US $ (1982); but the share of these exports in their
total exports remained almost constant at a rather low level of a little
more than 4 per cent (Table 3).
At country level, however, there have been some changes in intra-ACP
trade. Its shares increased in 25 countries but were outweighed by the
decreases in the remaining 27 reporting countries. More noteworthy is
that either or both of these years intra-ACP trade constitutes more than
one fifth of total exports of Barbados, Grenada, Gambia, Mali, Niger,
Burkina Faso, Senegal, Zimbabwe, Kenya, and Djibouti. This list in-



































































(a) In per cent of total imports.


























Poland, USSR. - (d) Afghanistan, I

































































































































































Guinea, Philippines, Samoa, Singapore, Solomon
































































































Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, GDR, Mongolia,
, Burma, China, Fiji,
Malaysia, Maldives, Nauru,


























































Caledonia, Pakistan, Papua, New
Tuvalu, Vanuatu, Viet Nam, Westerrl Samoa,
Source: IMF [a; b].Table 3 - Intra-ACP Trade and Share of Intra-ACP Trade in ACP Coun-







































































































































































1982 are based on extrapolations

















































































































Source: IMF [a; b].10
for more than one fourth of the total exports of ACP reporting countries
in 1982. However, in six out of the above ten countries ACP shares
moved upwards and in four downwards showing that changes were more
or less equally distributed and no conclusions can be drawn with regard
to any definite trend.
Four of the above countries with upward move of their intra-ACP ex-
ports participated in one or the other regional integration scheme (Bar-
bados in the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), Senegal in the West
African Economic Community (WAEC), Gambia and Burkina Faso in the
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)) whereas only two
of the countries with declining shares had such a participation (Mali and
Niger in WAEC). An attempt was made to examine whether intra-trade of
the various regional integration schemes contributed to intra-ACP trade.
The shares of the five major communities in intra-ACP trade of 1976 and
1982 are given in Table 4. In all cases the contribution of regional inte-
gration schemes to intra-ACP trade has increased. Maximum growth took
place in the Mano River Union (MRU), but its intra-ACP trade in the
base year was too small to allow any far-reaching conclusion. Next to it
in terms of growth are CARICOM and the Central African Customs and
Economic Union (CACEU). The share of the former in intra-ACP trade in
1982 rose by 37 per cent compared with 1976 and that of the latter by 33
per cent during the same period. The biggest of the regional integration
schemes among the ACP members is constituted by ECOWAS consisting of
16 countries. In 1982 it accounted for more than two fifths of the total
intra-ACP trade after an increase of 17 per cent between 1976 and 1982.
The francophone WAEC is the third largest integration organisation hav-
ing six members, which form a core group within ECOWAS. Its share of
intra-ACP trade increased by 12 per cent in 1982 compared with 1976
and accounted for about 17 per cent of total intra-ACP trade in 1982.
Table 4 - Contribution of Regional Integration Schemes to Intra-ACP
Trade, 1976 and 1982
Caribbean Ccrtmunity (CARICOM) (a)
Economic Camnunity of West African
States (ECOWAS)(b)
West African Econcfnic Ccmnunity
(WAEC) (c)
Mano River Union(d)
Central African Customs and Economic
Union (CACEU)(e)
(a) Barbados, Belize, Dominica,
St. Vincent, Trinidad and Tobago.















Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, St.
- (b) Benin,
Liberia, Mali,
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Burkina Faso, Togo, T (C)
Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal. -






(d) Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone.
Coast,
- (e)
Source: IMF [a; b].11

































































































































Source: IMF [a; b].
In total, if the former East African Community (Kenya, Tanzania, Ugan-
da) which has already collapsed is taken out of consideration, about 58
per cent of intra-ACP trade takes place within the individual communit-
ies. Thus, regional integration does appear to have made its contribution
to intra-ACP trade when measured by this share. However, a word of
caution is in order here in so far as these regional organisations are still
very young and their internal relations have been far from being free
from distributional conflicts. Further this analysis is based on a com-
parison of two years and some accidental factors may bias the above con-
clusions. It is for example by no means evident that trade flows within
the schemes are integration-induced, i.e. influenced by tax harmoniza-
tion or internal trade liberalization. A ranking of top 24 ACP countries
according to their shares in intra-ACP imports of 1976 and 1982 (Table
5) showed that occurrance of erratic changes in their regional pattern of
trade cannot be ruled out. Bahamas and Tanzania who occupied first
and fourth places, respectively, in 1976 had no ranking at all among the
first 24 most important ACP import markets in 1982. It seems noteworthy
that the Ivory Coast instead of Nigeria proved to be the main absorber
of ACP products though Nigeria's absorptive capacity rapidly increased
during the seventies. There are two possible explanations for this.
First, in 1982 Nigeria already suffered from severe balance of payments12
problems and consequently restricted imports drastically. This may have
affected imports from ACP countries as well. Second, the integration
level within francophone West Africa is much more advanced than be-
tween anglophone and francophone West African countries, so that the
Ivory Coast as the fastest growing country in the WAEC absorbs in-
creasing amounts of imports from her neighbours.
3. Structural Pattern of ACP Exports to the EC
ACP countries supply only about one twentieth of total non-oil demand of
the EC satisfied through imports from outside the Community. Their
share of these EC imports even declined from 6,2 per cent in 1975 to 4.5
per cent in 1982 (Table 6). The downward trend persists also when non-
oil imports of the EC from third countries are subdivided into three ma-
jor groups: total imports, agricultural imports and imports of semi-manu-
factures and manufactures from developing countries. The maximum re-
duction took place in the last category of goods where they lost one
third of their original share. The lowest rate of change was in the case
of agricultural goods. Here the ACP countries still supply a little more
than one fourth of EC imports from all developing countries.
These conclusions hold also for individual national markets in the EC.
The only exceptions are agricultural imports in West Germany, Belgium/
Luxemburg and Italy, where ACP shares of total imports from all deve-
loping countries have increased. The increase was lowest in West Germa-
ny and highest in Italy.
The UK used to be the most important market for ACP countries absorb-
ing about 29 per cent of their total exports in 1975. This share has gone
down to 22 per cent in 1982. This change was almost equally distributed
on agricultural and manufactured goods. Now in this context the first
place is occupied by France importing one fourth of the total ACP ex-
ports. The French market has however been more receptive for their
manufactured products than for agricultural goods. As compared to their
former metropoles, ACP countries have been able to export more to the
remaining EC members. Consequently the shares of West Germany, Bel-
gium/Luxemburg and Italy have risen in ACP exports to the EC. In the
case of semi-manufactures and manufactures West Germany has overtaken
the UK absorbing about one fifth of these exports of ACP countries into
the EC in 1982.
One per cent growth of GDP in the UK leads to less than half a per cent
growth of its imports from the ACP countries (Table 7). Theoretically it
is possible that the demand for imports supplied by these countries is
very inelastic in the UK. But the income elasticities for imports of both
agricultural goods and manufactures from the Latin American countries
are more than twice as high as for the ACP countries, although the for-
mer do not enjoy the trade preferences granted to the latter on account
of their association agreement .with the EC. This suggests that the rea-
sons for a slower growth of exports of the ACP members have to be
looked for mostly on the supply side. It is true that the growth of im-
ports from ACP countries during 1976 and 1982 has been slowest in the
UK amounting to only 5 per cent per year. But if the British domesticTable 6 - Changes in Market Shares and Regional Concentration of ACP Exports to the EC (a) and Major EC














Share of ACP countries in
total EC non-oil imports(b)
total EC non-oil imports from
developing countries (classe 2)
EC agricultural imports(c) from
developing countries
EC .imports from developing coun-
tries of semi-manufactures and
manufactures(d)
Regional Concentration of ACP
Exports to the EC
Share of individual EC member
countries in
ACP total non-oil exports to
the EC
ACP agricultural exports to
the EC
ACP exports of semi-manufactures
and manufactures to the EC
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24.9 28.9 21.7 9.8 11.6 11.4 11.8
23.6 36.4 29.2 1.8 2.7 7.6 9.6
27.9 21.3 15.5 12.8 14.8 13.6 13.6
(a) EC 9 in 1975, EC 10 in 1982. Since Greece holds a negligible share in EC imports from ACP countries (1982: 0.7 per
cent) the changes in shares are not distorted by the Greek accession. - (b) CCT 1-99 minus CCT 27. - (c) CCT 1-24.-
(d) CCT 25-99 minus CCT 27, 40, 74 (oil, rubber, copper).
Source: Eurostat [a, 1975, 1982].Table 7 - Average Annual Growth Rates of ACP, Latin American and Total Developing Countries' Exports (a)






































































(a) For definition of exports see Table 6 footnotes b, c, d. - (b) Defined as

































































the ratio between the annual average
Source: Eurostat [a, 1975, 1982; c].15
import demand was slack, exports of Latin America would not have risen
by as much as 14 per cent during this period. A similar pattern can be
observed for the EC as a whole as well as for the other individual mem-
bers, though here differences between the growth rates of imports from
Latin America and ACP members are not as high as in the UK. Two ex-
ceptions are Belgium-Luxemburg and Italy where the growth of agricul-
tural imports from ACP countries has been higher than that of agricul-
tural imports from Latin American countries. In both of these cases how-
ever the markets are very limited compared with those of the other mem-
bers of the EC. Moreover, in the case of manufactured imports the
growth for Latin America has been higher than for ACP members even in
these two countries.
On the whole in competition with Latin America ACP countries have been
able to fare better on the West German market than in other EC coun-
tries. The poorest performances are registered on the French and Brit-
ish markets from 1976 to 1982. It is possible that the erosion of some
exclusive preferential margins enjoyed by the former colonies in their
metropolitan countries after an introduction of EC preferences and/or
GSP is responsible for this phenomenon. Likewise one may hypothesize
that the traditional ACP exports on their former metropolitan markets
have approached saturation levels so that the growth of their imports is
now determined by their (low) growth of population. Scope for growth,
however, still exists on non-traditional markets such as the West German
market, and this seems to have been done by ACP suppliers in the tra-
ditional branches.
4. Market Accessibility for the Major ACP Exports to the EC
At five-digit SITC level 56 products accounted for 87.8 per cent of total
ACP exports to the EC in 1981 [Eurostat, b, p. 461]. Nearly the same
result is obtained also on the basis of CCT tariff items for 1982. The
latter disaggregation is however more suitable for an assessment of mar-
ket accessibility of ACP exports to the EC as compared with those of
competing suppliers from developed and other developing countries. Mar-
ket accessibility in this case is broadly speaking a function of (i) the
level of GATT-negotiated most-favoured-nation (MFN) tariffs, (ii) the
level of unilaterally imposed variable levies on products which are sub-
ject to the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), (iii) the changes of MFN
tariffs due to the Tokyo Round negotiations and (iv) the inclusion of the
products in the GSP.
Table 8 which provides information on these determinants yields the fol-
lowing results:
First, in 1982 as in 1977 57 tariff items accounted for 88 per cent of
total ACP exports. About 60 per cent of this total in 1982 was not duti-
able under MFN conditions. Thus, for more than half the ACP exports
which consists of agricultural and mineral primary commodities, ACP
trade preferences cannot be conceded. It is interesting to note that this
share increased rapidly between 1977 and 1982 because of rising oil pri-
ces. The share of crude petroleum in total exports was higher in 1982
than in 1977. In 1982 crude petroleum accounted for more than 40 per16
Table 8 - Major EC Imports from ACP Countries, 1977 and






0201 MI Mbb Beef
0301 BI b2 Whole tunny
0301 BI g2 Frozen saltwater fish
0301 BII b7 Frozen fillets of
saltwater fish
0303 AIV a Prawns and shrimps
0303 BIV a3 Molluscs
0701 FII a Beans
0701 T Other vegetables
0801 BI Bananas, fresh
0801 BII Bananas, dried




1006 MI b Long grainhusked rice
1507 DII all. Palm oil, crude
1507 DII b)2,aa Solid palm oil, crude
1602 Bill bl Bovine meat prepared
1604 E Canned tuna
1701 BI Raw sugar for refining




1803, 1804 Cocoa paste, butter
2006 BII b5 Canned pineapples
2102 A Solid extracts of coffee
2209 CI Rum
2302 MI a Cereal residues
2401 A Flue-cured Virginia
+ Burley tobacco
2820 A Aluminium oxide
4104 BI Goat skin leather
4414 BI a Tropical hard wood











































































































































5509 All Cotton fabrics
6005 All b4bb Jerseys, pullovers,
llccc 22fff slipovers
7601 AI Unwrought aluminium
Subtotal
Non-dutiable products
1201 B Oil seeds
1302 BI Gum arabic
2304 BII, V, VII Oil-cakes
2510 B Natural calcium
phosphate
2601 All Iron ore
2601 B-E Other ores
2709 Crude petroleum
4001 B Natural rubber
4101 AI bl Sheepskins
4101 All b2 Raw hides of bovines
4101 AIV Raw hides of goats
4403 B Wood in the rough
4405 C Wood sawn lengthwise
5501 B Raw cotton
5704 A Sisal fibres
7102 AI b Raw diamonds
7102 All Other precious stones
7107 A Unwrought gold
7401 B Unwrought copper





















































































































(a) L = Variable levy. ACP countries enjoyed partial preferential treatment according to Regu-
lation 706/76, i.e. a reduced variable levy for maize and duty-free treatment for a pre-fixed
maximum amount of beef imports. - (b) Minimum price and tariff quota for industrial processing.
- (c) Valid for Afganistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Haiti, Laos, Maledives, Nepal, North-Jemen,
South-Jemen. - (d) Tariff quota of 8 per cent. - (e) The EC tariff for bananas principally
refers to imports of the Benelux-countries, Ireland and Denmark. The major consumer countries
either admitted duty-free import quotas for banana imports from their former colonies in the
ACP region (i.e. France, UK, Italy) or are allowed to maintain traditional duty-free imports
from Latin America (West Germany according to the banana protocol in the Rome-treaty). -
(f) Palmkemel oil. - (g) G = eligible for a guaranteed price in the EC. - (h) Cocoapaste; on
cocoabutter tariff quota 8 per cent; for the countries listed unter footnote c tariffs on
cocoabutter are fully exempted. - (i) Specific tariff. - (j) Tariff quota. - (k) Ceiling under
surveillance. - (1) Ceiling for all beneficiaries and tariff quota for individual countries.
Source: Eurostat [a, 1977, 1982; d]; GATT [1979]; UNCTAD [b]; EC
[c]; own calculations.18
cent of total ACP exports to the EC. Hence, the ratio between dutiable
and non-dutiable ACP exports is determined mainly by the world market
price ratios between four products: oil and copper which are non-duti-
able products and coffee and cocoa which 'are dutiable items. In 1977,
when world market prices for coffee and cocoa reached their highest
post-war levels and prices for crude oil were not as high as in 1982 cof-
fee and cocoa accounted for higher shares in ACP exports and so did
their dutiable exports in total. In short, the extent to which tariffs and
hence tariff preferences can have an impact on total ACP exports is
widely determined by external factors. Trade policies of both contracting
parties of the Lome conventions have only a minor influence.
Second, among the dutiable items processed agricultural products and
textiles seem to be the core of non-traditional exports, though a clearcut
distinction between unprocessed and processed items on the one hand
and traditional and non-traditional exports on the other hand is difficult
to make. The share of dutiable processed products has slightly increased
between 1977 and 1982. However, what is more relevant, is the prefer-
ence margin enjoyed by these products. It emerges that this preference
margin has been eroded to a large extent vis-a-vis the least developed
countries (LLDCs) outside the ACP group. The EC has granted a full
exemption from tariffs for products like fish, coffee, cocoa, coffee ex-
tracts and cocoa butter originating from the LLDCs. However, the ad-
verse impact of this preference erosion on ACP exports is likely to be
small because of a very low supplying capacity of the LLDCs. Coffee
exports of Haiti which in 1981 scored a share of 1 per cent in total EC
coffee imports seem to be the only exception worth mentioning [Eurostat,
b, p. 355].
Third, ACP trade preferences have been eroded further by the reduc-
tion in tariffs on imports from all GSP beneficiaries. The list of products
affected comprises fish, shrimps, cloves, dried bananas, coffee extracts,
cocoa paste (where tariff quotas exist for GSP beneficiaries) and espe-
cially palm oil. The last product which is interesting for ASEAN was
included in the GSP in order to compensate countries like Malaysia and
Singapore for expiring Commonwealth preferences after the UK entry into
the EC.
Fourth, within the range of manufactures the GSP product coverage is
almost complete and this includes ACP exportables such as plywood and
veneer, cotton fabrics and clothing. Again, Southeast Asian countries
are the most competitive suppliers. However, rigid tariff quotas and
strict surveillance regulations for products with tariff ceilings have been
introduced in order to protect both domestic producers (textiles) as well
as ACP exports (plywood, veneer).
Fifth, the least important erosion of ACP preferences appears to have
occurred as a result of mutual tariff cuts in the Tokyo Round of trade
negotiations, because the majority of tariff reductions were in manufac-
tures which are exported by developed countries rather than by devel-
oping countries. Yet, two agricultural items (coffee and cocoa), which
are of major relevance for the ACP exporters, also fall in this category.
However, changes in prices of these commodities affect the final consum-
er prices in the EC only to a lesser extent because they are processed
in the EC. Price changes at the later processing stages may outweigh
changes in prices of raw commodities. Domestic excise duties are much
higher than the tariff and products originating from ACP and non-ACP19
countries (coffee, tea) are often blended with imports from other coun-
tries thus reducing their substitutability. On the whole, there is up to
now little evidence that the erosion of ACP preference margins for raw
coffee and raw cocoa by about 2 percentage points has caused any trade
diversion, which means that it has not resulted in shifting import de-
mand from ACP to non-ACP suppliers.
To summarize the overall preference margins of ACP countries, it seems
that the EC maintained them mainly by stricly limiting the tariff quotas
and ceilings for non-ACP developing countries rather than by keeping
the tariff margins constant.
This leads to an evaluation of specific preferences (ACP) versus general
preferences (GSP). In this respect it is necessary to compare actual ACP
exports in dutiable items receiving a complete preferential treatment with
preference-receiving exports of non-ACP beneficiaries under the GSP
regime. Table 9 provides a breakdown of ACP exports by broad GSP
categories of sensitive, semi-sensitive and non-sensitive manufactures
and agricultures. In 1981 duty-free imports of industrial products (in-
cluding textiles) originating from non-ACP and Mediterranean countries
under the GSP were more than five times as high as the corresponding
duty-free imports from ACP countries. A reciprocal of this ratio holds
for the three agricultural categories, where the MFN rates have mostly
Table 9 - Structure of EC Imports from ACP Countries and Non-ACP
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(a) Maghreb and Mashreq countries are excluded from the non-ACP Group of 77
members. Thus this group comprises all GSP beneficiaries except ACP, Maghreb and
Mashreq countries.
Source: Microfiche Statistics provided by Eurostat.20
been reduced only partly (not fully exempted) by the GSP so that ACP
countries still enjoy positive preference margins. In the industrial cate-
gories such preference margins have been fully eroded. What is more
important is that the preference-receiving exports of non-ACP developing
countries accounted only for about 38 per cent of the total exports of
these countries in GSP-covered items. This means that dutiable exports
from Latin America and Asia worth about 13.3 bill. ECU were charged
the full MFN rates before entering the EC market though they were
eligible for GSP treatment. Tariff quotas, ceilings and restrictive rules
of origin prevented them from receiving actual preferential treatment and
thus helped maintaining a sizeable part of ACP preferences.
Table 9 also illustrates the diverging pattern of specialization in the
non-traditional export supply of ACP countries and other developing
countries. Whereas in the former case processed agricultural goods eligi-
ble for the GSP accounted for 59 per cent of exports, in the latter case
such exports amounted to only 18 per cent. Hence, there is not much
trade overlap between the two kinds of suppliers in general. They are
rather complementary trade partners and a compromise between GSP and
ACP preferences should be feasible for them.
5. Market Accessibility for Non-Traditional ACP Exports to the EC: The Case of
Textiles
There are several reasons why ACP textile exports to the EC provoke
both hopes and fears in respect of their future growth. First, there is
room for hope since ACP export growth rates at the end of the seventies
and in the beginning of the eighties were much higher in this sector
than in other sectors. They were even higher than those of the rest of
developing countries. However, the ACP share in total developing coun-
tries' textile exports to the Community remained small (1.5 per cent in
1975 and 1.9 per cent in 1982, Table 10).
Second, there is room for fear since textiles (including clothing) repre-
sent the nucleus of EC protectionism against Third World country pro-
ducers of manufactures. Strong domestic protectionist forces in all the
EC member countries keep a close watch on the growth of import pene-
tration of their domestic markets regardless of the fact who penetrates
their markets which have been growing slowly. Since the origin of im-
ports does not matter for loss of jobs, this surveillance is also effective
against those developing countries which are not contracting parties of
the Multifibre Agreement (MFA) because of their special trade relations
with the EC. Mediterranean countries and the ACP group in particular
are such special trade partners of the EC whose textile exports are un-
der permanent surveillance both in order to prevent the circumvention of
the multifibre quotas via indirect imports through ACP countries and to
keep endogenous export-oriented textile production in ACP countries un-
der control.
The first target is achieved by means of restrictive rules of origin, the
second one by facultative ceilings (ligne ACP) and not by obligatory
quotas. The latter serve as a first warning, even before the start of
any consultations, not to invest excessively in sensitive textile items to
be exported to the Community.21
Table 10 - Share of Individual ACP Countries in Total ACP Textile and





















































Third, there is room for further fear because ex-ante ceilings in the
very few items where ACP countries proved to be relatively competitive
can provoke uncertainties and can thus have a discouraging effect on
export-oriented investments in other sectors.
In detail, export-oriented textile processing is concentrated in a few
ACP countries, viz. Mauritius (clothing), Ivory Coast (fabrics) and Ma-
dagascar. In 1975, the three countries accounted for 68 per cent of the
total ACP textile exports to the Community (Table 10). By 1982 they ac-
counted for even 92 per cent as Mauritius and the Ivory Coast were able
during this period to raise their shares from 38 to 52 per cent and from
14 to 26 per cent, respectively. Compared to the rest of developing
countries, especially to the MFA countries, 1981 Mauritius held but the
15th rank among the Third World country suppliers in its export domain,
that is knitwear, and the 37th rank in other clothing products [Euro-
stat, b, pp. 450-454].
However, even this comparatively minor threat to domestic jobs in the EC
textile industry from the ACP exports did not deter the Community from
introducing national safeguards against individual ACP exporters in the
late seventies (e.g. knitwear exports of Mauritius to the UK). Later on
the Community went further by establishing a similar network of intra-
EC member country ceilings on overall ACP exports as it was fixed for
each MFA signatory country in "hyper-sensitive" items on a quota basis.
Table 11 indicates the degree to which these ceilings were utilized in
1982. At the Community level ceilings were exceeded by the actual ex-Table 11 - Utilization of Indicative Ceilings (Ligne ACP) for ACP Exports to the EC in the Eight "Hyper-
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ports only in cotton yarn. In the case of pullovers which includes knit-
wear from Mauritius, the ceiling was almost fully utilized. The fact that
synthetic fibres ceilings were fixed though ACP countries did not export
under this category is a strong evidence for the prophylactic nature of
the "ACP ligne" and for the prevailing uncertainty with regard to the
potential competitiveness of ACP suppliers. Utilization rates for the EC
are, however, averages with considerable differences between the per-
formances in individual EC countries. Since it is on the national level
where restrictive measures are introduced first, the differences of utili-
zation rates deserve attention. It seems that a country like Italy which
primarily imports intermediate goods and processes them further domesti-
cally is less inclined to introduce restrictive measures once a ceiling has
been exceeded than countries like France or the UK whose imports from
ACP countries (and other developing countries) are concentrated on fin-
ished goods. Further, the differences in utilization rates between EC
members provide a strong incentive to import via those member countries
which have not yet exhausted their shares. Theoretically, in a customs
union which allows free circulation of goods internally there is no sense
in having quotas for individual members. Such quotas imposed on a rela-
tively small exporter like the ACP group, mirror a serious setback in the
internal integration process of the Community. The relatively small size
of the ACP group as an exporter of "hyper sensitive" goods is evident
from the share of ceilings in MFA negotiated quotas (last column, Table
11). In 1982, these ceilings did not exceed 10 per cent of the MFA quo-
tas and amounted to 4 per cent on the average.III. Exogenous Barriers to ACP Export Growth
1. Droughts and Desertification
Sahelian as well as some ACP countries south of the Congo basin have
suffered and are currently suffering again severely from a succession of
drought years. The ecologically very fragile and vulnerable character of
these arid areas and the extreme variability of Sahelian rainfalls make it
rather difficult to detect a "normal" pattern and hence a long-term trend
of climatic conditions [Katz, Glantz, 1977], Nonetheless, it cannot be
denied that the droughts have at least reinforced - if not partly caused
- long-term tendencies of food production shortages and changing human
fertility habits.
This is evident in Table 12. The average arable land and land under
permanent crops measured as a percentage of total land available in-
creased by only 0.3 percentage points between 1969 and 1979. At the
same time population growth augmented from 2.5 per cent annually in the
sixties to 2.7 per cent in the seventies and per capita food production
decreased steadily by 1 to 2 per cent annually.
This pattern has been relatively uniform with only a few exceptions such
as the recovery of food production in Niger. The actual situation might
have been even worse than reflected in the table because within the ca-
tegory of arable land some areas have deteriorated to fallow land after
shifting cultivation.
The reasons for such a serious development are manifold. They encom-
pass, apart from natural shocks, internal policy failures resulting in
distorted urban-rural terms of trade to the detriment of rural produc-
tion, inappropriate incentives to give up nomadism, or traditional habits
such as extensive livestock production, which does not react to market
signals. Furthermore, drought effects have been exacerbated by factors
such as changing economic habits (for example the reliance on food aid),
water development projects leading to the salinization and alkalinization
of land, post-harvest food losses, and the lack of generally accepted
property rights either on a collective or on a private level.
One of the principal consequences of natural shocks is labour migration.
It is the mobile and relatively skilled part of labour which is leaving the
arid areas and migrating to the climate belt south of the Sahel. Senegal
and the Ivory Coast have been the most attractive destinations with the
result that the inherent tendency of inter-state migration during the
harvest season in the tropical areas has been intensified. Whereas in
1974 only 60 000 non-Ivorian Africans worked in the formal Ivorian sec-
tor, this number increased to about 78 000 in 1979. It is rather evident
that expatriate employment in the formal sector is only the peak of the
iceberg since the majority of unskilled people migrating from desertifi-
cated areas is illegally employed or settled in the informal sector. The
loss of embodied entrepreneurship, initiatives and stimulants in the Sahel
countries due to the exodus is hence the most disturbing economic con-
sequence of natural shocks. Furthermore, water scarcity will also result
in higher production costs and hence in deterioration of competitiveness25
Table 12 - Basic Data on Land Use, Population Growth and Per Capita
















































































































































total population in the relevant
Source: FAO [b]; World Bank [c].
compared to neighbouring countries which do not face such incremental
costs. In the case of francophone Sahelian countries which are members
of the Franc Zone the adjustment to deteriorating competitiveness against
southern neighbouring countries through currency depreciations is not
possible. Thus, unless real wages are reduced, Sahelian countries will
lose in relative competitiveness.
Droughts will also have repercussions on the contribution of both import-
ed and local food to the domestic apparent consumption. It is possible
that due to rising shares of imported food (food aid or food bought at
market terms) the attitude of the remaining population will change from a
risk-bearing to a transfer-receiving conduct. Again, together with the
loss of human capital because of migration and with impaired physical
health conditions of the remaining labour force, export orientation to-
wards non-traditional goods will depend on the inflow of foreign risk
capital and entrepreneurship. Since such investments face high opportu-
nity costs because of the poor environmental conditions, it is rather un-
likely that the inflow of non-risk capital (aid) and the other options of
the Lome conventions can compensate drought-affected countries for
these environmental disadvantages.
To conclude, long-term worsening environmental conditions in some ACP
countries suggest that they should focus on strategies which strengthen26
local individual entrepreneurial initiatives at every level. Without such
initiatives further drought periods will have disastrous effects. By guar-
anteeing a minimum income level the EC can diminish political fears about
the exploitation of immobile and unskilled people by local entrepreneurs.
Viewed against a situation of a general idleness of resources based on
transfers from abroad, however, economic growth and inequalities
through exploitation appear to be the less controversial alternative.
2. Plant and Animal Diseases
As with droughts, plant and animal diseases - besides their unquestioned
character of a natural shock - cannot be separated from the social and
economic environment in which they occur. The environment can contri-
bute to exacerbate the spread of inherent diseases of export crop mono-
cultures through the lack of established and generally accepted property
rights. On the other hand, it may facilitate controlling pests effectively
if property rights are clearly defined and if governments do not provide
disincentives, for instance through excessive export tax or state inter-
ventions in private sales decisions to economically profitable plant pro-
duction.
The fact that agriculture and livestock in African countries have been
most susceptible to plant and animal diseases during the last two decades
is illustrated by the plant disease outbreaks recorded by FAO [a] and
by the resurgence of trypanosomiasis in the seventies. Export crops
have been more frequently affected by plant diseases than local crops
such as cassava, yams, millet or sorghum. This coincides with the ob-
servation that the genetic uniformity of new high-yield crop monocultures
provide ecologically ideal environments for pathogens to evolve and to
attack plants [Pimentel, Pimentel, 1978]. With regard to the presence of
tsetse flies and the resulting disease of trypanosomiasis, it is estimated
that this disease hinders the use of some 10 million square kilometers for
livestock or agricultural production [World Bank, a, p. 73]. The payoff
for increased investments in pest controls, disease research and tsetse
eradication mainly depends on the additional income earned from the new
"cleaned" areas under permanent cultivation. Here again the crucial role
of government's influence on internal rural-urban terms of trade is very
important. If additional income to be gained from employing resources in
sectors other than the eradication of plant and animal diseases is higher,
private investments in the latter sector will not be launched. Financing
of public investments by internal and/or external non-risk capital will
also be facilitated if price ratios are not distorted. Investments in main-
tenance of the quality and volume of export crop production are indis-
pensable since export crops are, besides mineral raw materials, the most
important source of traditional export earnings for most of the ACP coun-
tries. Further, they are needed for export diversification in the field of
agricultural processing industries such as canned food or cotton manu-
facturing. Such attempts have been made successfully for instance in the
Ivory Coast and Cameroon. However, it should be noted that they
proved successful because of new high-yield varieties of the "green re-
volution" (bananas, coffee, cocoa, pineapples, etc.) which were both
suitable for profitable processing and fitted into the demand patterns of
developed countries; But just these varieties are also vulnerable against27
diseases. Given this trade-off between profitability and vulnerability,
external financial assistance to research, control and eradication of plant
and animal diseases on a regional scale is necessary
- to maintain the export basis of many ACP countries in terms of agri-
cultural primary commodities,
- to promote export diversification strategies in agricultural processing
and
- to stabilize the local livestock production.
Yet, without the establishment of clearly defined property rights on land
and its use such an assistance will be less efficient. Thus, an incentive
system through property rights must be introduced and controlled by
the local governments.
3. Transportation Costs of Seaborne Trade
Transportation costs are frequently assumed to be major barriers to ACP
trade in general and to their exports in particular. While this is evident
for land-locked ACP countries suffering from inadequate transportation
facilities for surface trade, transportation costs for seaborne trade must
not necessarily be higher for other ACP countries than for the remaining
developing countries. The recent modernization of ACP countries' ports
together with technological innovations of roll-on/roll-off ships, container
services, etc. should facilitate their participation in international trade if
the volume of trade to and from these countries would allow for an eco-
nomically viable utilization of available transportation capacity. The often
cited chicken-and-egg problem of low trade volume and high transporta-
tion costs does not exist in reality: once there is demand for goods sup-
plied by ACP countries, transportation barriers will disappear within a
relatively short time. The rapid construction of modern port facilities in
oil-exporting countries bears witness to this argument.
A discussion of the incidence of transportation costs on ACP exports in
detail, faces conceptual as well as statistical problems. Costs are dif-
ferent according to products, transportation media, frequency of ship-
ping, but not necessarily according to distance. A remoteness factor in
seaborne trade can be outweighed by economies of scale induced by a
large trade volume and subsequently by the utilization of a transporta-
tion technology which reduces costs per mile.
a. Cif/Fob Ratios as Transportation Cost Proxies for ACP Imports
With respect to ACP countries several indicators are introduced in order
to highlight the incidence of transportation costs. There is first of all
the cif/fob ratio of ACP countries' imports assessed by the IMF. The
presence of evidence for ACP exports implies that the same ratios hold
for the export side. This is questionable since the structure of their
imports differs from that of their exports. This has implications for their
transportation costs. ACP countries import manufactures, which are gen-28
eral cargo in freight terms, and they export primary commodities, which
are in form of liquid or dry bulk trade.
The former trade is influenced by liner conferences and other interven-
tions and hence is more regulated and less competitive than bulk trade
where outsiders can operate more easily. This could mean that transpor-
tation costs of ACP countries' imports are systematically higher than the
costs of their exports. Table 13 shows the IMF cif/fob ratios minus unity
for the imports of the reporting ACP countries. It is at first glance ob-
vious that the assessments, which are rough rules of thumb "guessti-
mates", lie in the range of 10 to 30 per cent. Mostly ratios have been
assumed to be constant over time so that the import-weighted average
using the same weights for the four years of observation yields only
minor changes (between 12.5 and 14.4 per cent). Generally land-locked
countries face higher transportation costs than countries having direct
sea access. Increases in transportation costs are probably more due to
fuel price increases rather than due to higher shares of relatively trans-
portation cost-intensive goods in the import basket.
The comparison between costs for land-locked ACP countries and their
neighbouring sea-located transit countries indicates the importance of
surface transportation costs. Imports of the Central African Republic
(CAR) via Cameroon, for instance, imply the doubling of transportation
costs compared to those of Cameroonian imports. CAR imports via Congo
on the other hand reveal lower mark-ups on costs prevailing for Congo-
lese imports which, however, are higher than the costs of the Cameroon-
ian imports. Trans-shipment costs are obviously a source of freight rate
increases, and trans-shipment by using railways, river transport and
trucks is the rule rather than the exception in intra-ACP countries'
transportation network.
To summarize, the IMF ratios have systematic mistakes so that only a
comparison of import freight rates between individual ACP countries may
be justified. However, because of distinct differences in the composition
of ACP imports and exports no conclusion can be drawn with regard to
absolute or relative (vis-a-vis non-ACP competitors) levels of transpor-
tation costs charged on ACP exports. Such conclusions necessitate the
availability of import statistics on a cif and fob basis for countries im-
porting goods from ACP countries. There are, however, only three
countries publishing such data, viz. the USA (1), Brazil and the Philip-
pines. Being a minor importer of ACP products, the Philippines have
been dropped from further calculations. Tables 14 and 15 therefore illus-
trate the ad valorem incidence of transportation costs of the two other
countries' imports from ACP countries and their major competitors.
b. Cif IFob Ratios as Transportation Cost Proxies for ACP Exports
Given the structure of the ACP export supply, the items are nearly ex-
clusively primary commodities. Two major findings emerge from the US
(1) Since 1982 the USA applies for a specific customs import value for
comparison instead of the formerly used free-alongside-ship value.
Since the customs import value excludes freight costs, it may be
applied for the ad valorem incidence as well.29
Table 13 - Ad valorem Incidence of Transportation Costs of ACP














































































(a) (cif/fob-1) 100. - (b) 1978.































































































































data. First, generally freight costs have not been higher on imports
originating from ACP countries compared to other origin countries. In
the majority of cases they have been even lower. Second, the product
structure of transportation costs charged on ACP-originating products is
strongly correlated with the structure of US imports from non-ACP sour-
ces. This conclusion is supported by a Spearman rank correlation coeffi-
cient of 0.73 which is statistically significant at 1 per cent level. These
results are more surprising as non-ACP countries export mostly much
larger volumes in specific items to the USA than the ACP countries.
Only in few goods (vanilla beans, cocoa beans, sisal, crude bauxite and
gum arabic) individual ACP countries occupy top ranks as a third coun-30
Table 14 - Ad valorem Incidence of Transportation Costs (a) of US























































































































































































































(a) Defined as (cif/CV - 1) 100, where CV is the customs import value of US imports (price
actually paid or payable for merchandise when sold for exportation to the USA, excl. US import
duties, freight insurance and other charges incurred in bringing the merchandise to the USA).
cif is equal to CV plus freight, insurance and other charges (excl. US import duties).
Source: U.S. Dept. of Commerce [1982].31
try supplier on the US market. Thus, one could expect economies of
scale in transportation to be more relevant as breaks to cost increases
for non-ACP exporters than for ACP exporters. However, this does not
seem to be the case. Three explanations are possible. First, the ACP
country bulk export volume (in terms of tons) is bigger than a shipload.
Thus, it exceeds the minimum threshold level of profitable transport vol-
ume. Second, competition in bulk trade is strong especially if this trade
is ruled by long-established traditional goods, for which efficient port
facilities (cranage, stevedoring) already exist in ACP countries. Third,
if there are economies of scale in transporting large volumes this may be
partly outweighed by larger distances (Southeast Asia, Australia) for
non-ACP exports to be shipped to the US East Coast ports than for Ca-
ribbean or West African exports. Aluminium oxide exports from Jamaica
compared to those from Australia suggest such countervailing effects. On
the other hand, transportation costs for raw coffee being the same re-
gardless of whether the USA import coffee from the Ivory Coast, Ethio-
pia or Uganda, do not support the hypothesis of distances as a major
determinant of transportation costs.
In general ACP exporters of bulky goods do hot seem to face serious
transportation cost disadvantages on the American market against non-
ACP suppliers (1). The prevailing structure of ACP exports does not
allow for testing these conclusions for general cargo, viz. finished
goods. The only case worth mentioning in Table 14 is of clothing exports
from Mauritius to the USA which face higher transportation costs than
those from the leading exporting countries, viz. Hong Kong.
However, there is evidence that ACP non-traditional exports are charged
higher transportation costs per unit because of the small volume which
makes liner services unremunerative and hence exports through trans-
shipment costly.
Similar conclusions emerge from the analysis of transportation costs for
the few ACP originating items imported by Brazil (Table 15). The most
important items, crude oil exported by Nigeria, crude aluminium exported
by Ghana and Suriname, natural rubber supplied by Liberia and copper
exported by Zaire and Zambia are not discriminated against competing
exports from Saudi Arabia, Canada, Singapore or Chile. In the case of
crude oil and rubber the ACP countries are even better off. The reverse
holds for small portions of ACP exports like graphite, seeds or cinna-
mon. Low value products such as bauxite reveal higher freight cost com-
ponents than processed goods (aluminium oxide). Since this holds for
non-ACP exporters as well, domestic exploitation of commodities receives
a natural rate of protection and may inhibit both ACP and non-ACP ex-
ports.
To conclude, bulk exports shipped from ACP countries to the USA and
Brazil seem to be subject to similar freight cost-induced mark-ups on
export prices as they exist for exports from non-ACP sources. Instead
of transportation costs in bulk seaborne trade attention should be de-
voted to surface trade and its costs and to seaborne trade in general
(1) A few exceptions are: iron ore from Liberia or unwrought zinc from
Zaire.32
Table 15 - Ad valorem Incidence of Transportation Costs of Brazilian

























































































































Source: Ministerio de Fazenda [1981].
cargo. The rapid containerization of the latter trade will evidently re-
duce costs of trans-shipment where liner services are not economically
viable and hence will be to the benefit of ACP exporters of small volumes
of manufactures. However, the surface trade problem will continue to
exist. Improving the road network by aid financing cannot promote trade
unless other export disincentives which have their roots in the factor
endowment and factor prices of land-locked countries are eliminated.33
4. Travel and Communication Costs
The national and international division of labour crucially depends on
media for communication, i.e. telephone, telex, other postal services, air
and surface transportation nets. Though it is true that a fully developed
communication network is not a strong prerequisite for economic market
activities, it is likewise true that without a minimum availability of infra-
structure natural barriers to market activities can become prohibitive.
The result of prohibitive barriers to market activities is that traditional
know-how which otherwise would face adjustment pressures resulting in
productivity increases receives maintenance rents and impedes the devel-
opment process.
The experience of development process throughout the world, has, how-
ever, taught that the chicken-and-egg view of poor economic perfor-
mance and bad infrastructure is misleading. The development of infra-
structure runs parallel to the growth process, and it is the alliance of
economic subjects forecasting profits from entering new fields of division
of labour which either builds up infrastructure networks itself or urges
for governmental financing of infrastructure. It conforms the economic
rationale that the nature and direction of infrastructure is closely related
to the needs of those who have been economically active. For instance,
African railways were built either for military purposes by the colonial
powers or in order to transport natural resources to the nearest port.
Local needs dominated over interregional targets. Since the financing of
railway networks depends almost exclusively on foreign sources, the
cost-benefit analyses are made by them in terms of their measurable pro-
fitability rather than in terms of social returns to "intangible" factors.
Under these premises the denial by the World Bank to finance railways
of regional dimensions such as the TANZAM-railway or the Chad trunk of
the TRANSCAMEROUNAIS or even local railway nets such as the TRANS-
GABONAIS whose private remunerativeness is doubtful, is logical. Pri-
vate profitability has also ruled the establishment of unique transpor-
tation systems such as the trunk from the Congolese OCEAN-railway to
M'Binda, which is the terminal of the Gabonese cable-car system for
transporting manganese ore.
The same holds for ports and the main roads. Both topography and cli-
mate pose considerable engineering costs whose pay-off depends on the
prices of low-value and bulky primary products.
Likewise, the telecommunication network is based on colonial structures
linking the ACP countries to their former metropolitan countries but not
to each other. Further, different technical standards inherited from Me-
tropolitan countries impede links between ACP countries. They face addi-
tional problems and costs also because of unfavourable climate. The low
population density and the enormous space dimensions impede efficient
and regular postal services as well (1). The efforts to economize on
funds by negotiating regional communication networks on a multilateral
basis have proved to be of little success as shown by the failures of the
East African Common Services and the Agence Transequatoriale des Com-
(1) For a summary of African postal services in comparison with other
developing areas in the seventies see UPU [1978].munications (Congo, CAR, Chad). Given the scarcity of public foreign
funds, the overall stagnation of ACP countries' economic development on
a very low level, and the high investment costs per capita for almost
any transportation medium in ACP countries, there is no hope that the
already overproportional share of transport and telecommunications in
IDA-lending to Sub-Saharian Africa (about 30 per cent compared to 17
per cent for all developing countries) [World Bank, b] will be signifi-
cantly increased. Nor can it be expected that private funds can be
raised in such amounts which would in any way be enough to solve the
problem.
There is only one transportation medium, that is air transport, in which
ACP countries are not in a worse situation than other developing coun-
tries. The colonial heritage and natural disadvantages have not put bar-
riers to the establishment of an air traffic network which is locally as
well as regionally fairly well-developed given the income level of the
countries concerned. It is this medium on which export diversification
should be based. This holds because processed goods are more viable for
air transport than bulky and low-value commodities because of their val-
ue-added content.
However, in spite of this relatively favourable situation ACP countries
have to cope also with locational disadvantages in air transport. Table 16
on passenger fares and general cargo rates for a variety of flight con-
nections between Europe and developing countries as well as within Afri-
ca shows that in 1980 on the average passenger fares per km were
higher for flights within Africa and between Africa and Europe than for
flights between Europe and Latin America or between Europe and Asia.
Average rates for general cargo, however, hardly differed on a per km
basis. Since these data are recorded for scheduled flights, price dif-
ferences may be larger for non-scheduled flights with special tariffs
which are more often supplied in services between Europe and Asia than
between Europe and Africa or within Africa. In other words, competition
resulting in downward pressures on fares is more intensive on non-Afri-
can flights.
Reasons for the upward deviation of costs in flight connections with and
within Africa are clear from Table 17. Here comparisons of revenue/cost
ratios and quantitative estimates of some of the causes of regional devi-
ations from world average of total operating costs in 1979 are given. In
general, operating costs per passenger-km for routes within Africa ex-
ceeded those of world total routes by 45 per cent (10.0 US cents com-
pared to 6.9 US cents). Compared to the alternative destinations viz.
Asia or Latin America, flights between Europe, Middle East and Africa
are also more expensive. Differences in competition intensities are re-
flected in net revenues of flights which amount to 4 per cent in Africa
and to zero or less on other routes. Thus, it appears that profits are
squeezed on competition-intensive routes such as Europe-Asia and Eu-
rope-Latin America rather than within Africa and between Africa and
Europe where a much smaller number of airlines operate.
Upward deviations in costs are determined mainly by the relatively short
distances in intra-African flights which influence the choice of aircrafts
in favour of smaller size with relatively high operating costs on km ba-35
Table 16 - Passenger Fares and Cargo- Rates in Air Transport between
ACP Countries, between ACP Countries and Europe, and be-

















































































































































































































Source: ICAO [b]; own calculations.
sis. Furthermore, prices of aircraft fuel are higher in Africa than else-
where. On the other hand neither exorbitant airport charges nor high
idle capacities (vacant seats) can be observed in flights within Africa,
whereas the latter factor explains one third of upward deviations in Eu-
rope-Africa flights. Here commercial and socioeconomic conditions (costs
of booking agencies and all passenger-related services such as catering,
telecommunication, booking, reservation, etc.) emerge as the major
source of higher operating costs.36
Table 17 - Revenue/Cost Comparisons of Flight Services within Africa
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To summarize, relative air transport disadvantages for travelling to and
within Africa are modest. They are determined by both economic factors
such as the obvious lack of competition between the carriers and natural
determinants (length of flight stages). Such disadvantages are, however,
easier to surmount than the heritage of a colonially-oriented network and
the costs of unfavourable climate and topography. Given the situation of
land-locked countries and the economies of scale of regionally integrated
networks, regional cooperation aiming at the reduction of travel and com-37
munication costs seems to be indispensable. However, conflicts on voting
rights in the multilateral administration of joint services and on the dis-
tribution of net gains have prevented some regional arrangements from
operating over a longer period. On the other hand, success of coopera-
tion in air transport such as Air Afrique allow for more optimistic expec-
tations in the future.
5. OH Price Shocks
Some of the ACP countries (Congo, Gabon, Nigeria, Trinidad and Toba-
go) belong to the category of oil-exporting countries. Their export earn-
ings increased as a direct consequence of sudden increases in oil prices
in the seventies. Particularly Nigeria was able to raise its oil exports
tremendously (1). The following observations on oil price shocks as an
exogenous barrier to export growth are therefore confined to those ACP
countries which are net importers of oil and had to face highly inflated
import bills and rising costs of production as a result of increased oil
prices.
The rise of oil prices had two major contrary effects on the exports of
non-oil developing countries. On the one hand they were adversely af-
fected through the resulting relapse of economic activity and hence of
import demand for their goods in their main export markets of industrial
countries. On the other hand, the demand for their goods and in some
selected cases also for services in the oil-exporting countries increased
due to rising exchange earnings of the OPEC countries.
In addition to these two major effects, exports of non-oil ACP countries
may have been adversely affected by domestic inflation, the worsening of
international competitiveness of their goods and the shortage of imported
inputs resulting from the import restrictions introduced in these coun-
tries to face the balance-of-payments problem arising from higher oil
prices. The non-oil developing countries tried to solve these problems on
the supply side through various export promotion measures including
devaluation of their currencies. A detailed analysis of these issues for
many non-oil developing countries [Agarwal et al., 1983] showed a con-
siderable effect of oil price shock on domestic inflation, though it varied
from year to year and from country to country. Their international com-
petitiveness suffered in the case of mineral tar and crude chemicals
(SITC 52) but not elsewhere because in the competing countries also the
relative prices were affected by the oil price shocks. In textiles, travel
goods, clothing and footwear (SITC 65, 83, 84 and 85) they were even
able to improve their competitive positions. This could not be considered
however as an effect of the oil price shock because the trend for this
improvement had begun already before the massive increase of prices of
oil in 1973. Nonetheless this is an indication of the fact that the import
restrictions in developing countries were selective to avoid some of their
negative effects on the export sector.
(1) Nominal as well as real oil prices have however gone down in the last
two to three years and some of these countries have serious difficul-
ties in financing the projects which were planned on the basis of
projected increased oil prices of the seventies.38
The oil price shock induced the developing countries to raise the priori-
ties of exports promotion measures in order to pay the increased bill of
imported oil. The success of these measures was marked more for Latin
American and especially Asian developing countries than for African
countries. The Ivory Coast and Congo however constitute exceptions.
They were successful in raising their total exports as compared to many
other African countries [ Agarwal et al., 1983, p. 127], This large ma-
jority of oil-importing countries adjusted to the oil price shock by re-
ducing their imports through decrease in economic growth rates and
through import substitution. This was especially true for low-income
Subsaharian countries, to a lesser extent for middle-income countries
which could mobilize additional external savings (1).
Coming back now to the effect of oil price shocks on exports to indus-
trial countries it is sure that the import demand of these countries de-
creased relatively more than that of the remaining world. How much the
ACP countries were also affected by this demand shrinkage depended
very much, among other things, on their market shares of these coun-
tries. The estimates for the Ivory Coast, Madagascar and Senegal alone
amounted to a loss of 829 Mill. US $ during 1974 and 1978. However,
only about 27 per cent of this loss can be attributed to the oil price
shock which was about 18 per cent of their estimated exports (trend
values) (2). The other African countries were not affected so much be-
cause of their low market shares in the industrial countries. Such de-
tailed estimates for the period after the second oil price shock are not
available, but the shares of some of ACP countries (Ivory Coast, Kenya,
Sudan, Tanzania, Zambia) in total world exports in the years 1979 to
1981 show that their exports suffered mainly due to depression in indus-
trial countries [Agarwal et al., 1983, p. 177] which was caused to some
extent by this oil price shock. During this period the protectionist ten-
dencies in the developed countries gained further strength. The ACP
countries have, however, not been affected by them as much as some
other developing countries like South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, India,
Pakistan, Brazil, Argentina and Malaysia because they enjoy a more fa-
vourable preferential treatment of their goods in the EC than the rest of
the developing countries. Moreover, most the goods exported by them
were raw materials and therefore not subject to protectionist measures.
The positive side of the oil price shock was characterised by a massive
increase in the import demand of oil exporting countries as a result of
their increased export earnings. These earnings rose in the case of
OPEC countries from 25 bill. US $ in 1972 to 140 bill. US $ in 1978 and
by 1981 they again almost doubled due to oil price increases of 1979 and
1980. The total imports of the OPEC members rose from 14 bill. US $ to
about 93 bill. US $ in 1978 and then to 131 bill. US $ in 1981. Develop-
ing countries as a group were able to benefit from this demand expan-
sion only proportionately in the sense that their share of OPEC imports
(1) For a detailed empirical analysis of policy responses to oil price
shocks see Balassa [1983].
(2) These amounts are derived from estimated hypothetical and trend
values of exports in all the industrial countries. For the underlying
model and detailed calculations see Agarwal et al. [1983, p. 28 ff].39




































































































































































Source: IMF [a; b, 1983].
remained constant at about 12 per cent during 1972 and 1978. In the
following two years, however, it increased to 17 per cent. OPEC-imports
from developing countries amount to about one third of OPEC-exports to
these countries whereas for the industrial countries the import /export
ratio is around one half [Agarwal et al., 1983, p. 11 ff. ]. The funda-
mental explanation for this is that a greater part of OPEC import demand
and its expansion since the first oil price shock has been for industrial
goods supplied mainly by the developed countries.Total exports of major non-oil ACP countries to OPEC are given in Table
18. It shows that they were able to increase their exports to OPEC
countries more than proportionately among the developing countries. The
share of OPEC members in total exports of major non-oil ACP countries
increased during 1970 and 1982 more than five folds whereas for the
developing countries as a whole this ratio comes to a little more than
three, although the supply structure of ACP countries was not much
different from that of the rest of the developing countries. Most of this
success is attributable to Madagascar, Sudan and Tanzania. Their prox-
imity to some of the domestic markets of OPEC members seems to have
been partly responsible for this success. This point should, however,
not be overemphasised because the exports of ACP countries in the base
year were comparatively very low. Further a comparison of shares of
ACP countries in total imports of OPEC with those of other developing
countries especially some of Asian ones does not allow a very favourable
comment [Agarwal et al., 1983, p. 19 ff.].
To summarize, the net effect of decreasing import demand in industrial
countries and increasing import demand in OPEC countries seems to have
been negative for the majority of ACP net importers of oil. This result is
almost exclusively determined by their export supply structure based on
primary commodities.IV. EC Trade Policy-Induced Barriers to ACP Export Growth and Ex-
port Diversification
1. Transfers Tied to Traditional Exports Instead of Trade Stimulants
Trade preferences conceded to the ACP countries in the Lome conven-
tions for virtually all ACP exports allow a duty- and levy-free entry into
the EC. However, there are politically rooted exceptions to this general
form of preferences. One of them refers to sugar, which is subject to
EC market regulations within the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).
According to the sugar protocol, which is an annex to the Lome conven-
tions and a follower of the Commonwealth sugar protocol, quotas exist
for ACP raw sugar producers who export a prefixed volume of sugar to
the EC free of duties and levies at a guaranteed price. The obligation to
deliver on the ACP side has its counterpart in the obligation to accept
on the EC side. If the EC price is above the world market price - which
is normally the case due to the EC internal price stabilization schemes -
the sugar protocol implies a product-tied income transfer from the EC to
the ACP sugar exporters. The income transfer is equal to the product of
the quota and the difference between the EC and the world market
price. In the opposite case of lower EC prices (as was the situation in
1980) the transfer is negative for the ACP countries. However, in those
cases where the EC price is above the world market price the transfer
as defined above should be deflated because part of it has to be re-
garded as a compensation for the loss of ACP export earnings which
emerge from downward pressures on the world market prices partly as a
result of the EC internal surplus production. Thus in 1978/79 about one
fifth of the transfer was estimated to be a compensation for the loss of
ACP export earnings [Schmitz, Koester, 1981] due to the effects of the
EC sugar policy on the world sugar market. Hence, according to these
estimates the net transfer turned out to be lower than the sum paid.
Though the aid element in the sugar protocol is beneficial to the ACP
countries (measured against the hypothetical situation of no sugar proto-
col but everything else being equal), the protocol in connection with the
EC agricultural policy does not stimulate ACP exports: first, the sugar
protocol merely ensures a privileged market access which already existed
for Commonwealth countries on the British market before the entry of
the UK into the EC. In this sense, the sugar protocol provides no addi-
tional preferential treatment of ACP sugar exports.
Second, trade preferences provide price incentives which result in the
familiar effects of trade creation and trade diversion according to the
theory of customs unions. However, due to the sugar protocol changes
in relative prices are excluded so that the quotas conceded to the ACP
countries are relevant only for determining the transfer sum but fail to
stimulate trade. What is more relevant in the context of promotion of
non-traditional ACP exports is that the sugar protocol contributes to
keep resources (labour and capital) in the traditional sector which would
otherwise have gone to non-traditional sectors.To put it differently, the sugar protocol as a product-tied transfer
changes the income proportions between traditional and non-traditional
sectors in sugar-exporting ACP countries in favour of the former sector.
In any case, the sugar protocol thereby perpetuates the existing pro-
duction structures and does not give incentives to reallocate local re-
sources to non-traditional sectors. This holds regardless of the fact
whether the transfer provides incentives to increase sugar production or
not. It is sufficient for the change of income proportions to be effective
that the transfer discriminates against activities in non-sugar sectors.
To the extent that the resources absorbed in the sugar sector could
yield a higher average factor productivity in sectors where output is not
limited by non-market regulations, the transfer is unproductive. It im-
pedes structural changes in the ACP economies by hampering the flow of
resources to non-traditional activities.
2. Product Coverage in ACP Trade Preferences and Preference Redundancy
About 60 per cent of total exports of ACP countries to the EC in 1982
was accounted by twenty primary commodities which are freely importable
to the Community from all countries. Thus there is no preferential treat-
ment of the imports of these goods from the associated countries in the
EC. ACP exports of additional 37 items amounted to about 28 per cent of
total imports of the EC from these countries. In these items the ACP
imports enjoyed tariff preferences of varying degrees (Table 8). A third
group of ACP exports consisting almost solely of agricultural products
constituted approximately 4 per cent of these exports. In many of these
products the ACP exports were also given a preferential treatment within
the CAP of the member countries (Table 19).
An important question which arises in this connection is whether the
preferences granted to the imports from the ACP countries are effective
to promote their exports to the Community or whether they are redun-
dant in this respect.
A rather simplified approach has been used here for analysing this ques-
tion. It is assumed that the ACP exporters face competition on the Com-
mon Market only from the exports of the nonassociated developing coun-
tries and that products are homogenous (Law of One Price). As long as
the import price of a product of ACP countries is lower than the import
price (1) of non-ACP product, a preference margin in favour of the for-
mer is not necessary to promote its exports in the Common Market. If in
spite of that a preference margin is introduced, the ACP import becomes
still cheaper than the import from the nonassociated developing countries
and in this case the preference margin is considered to be positively
redundant. In all those items in column C of Table 20 where the values
are lower than unity, preferential tariffs lead to a positive preference
redundancy. That means that the actual preferential rate conceded to the
(1) Import prices are considered to be equal to unit values of imports
from the respective group of countries.Table 19 - ACP Agricultural Exports Having No or Less than Full Tariff






















































































































(a) Subject to an annual plafond with reduced tariffs after which the common tariff
is again applied. - (b) In containers holding 2 litres and more: 0; see also rum
protocol. - L = variable levy. - L.r. = reduced rate of variable levy. -
ads = additional duty on sugar contained in the product.
Source: EC [a]; Eurostat [a, 1982].ACP countries exceeds the rate which would be necessary to compete
with non-ACP suppliers.
Quite contrary to this is the case where the ACP price is so high that
even a tariff discrimination of non-ACP imports does not change the
price relation between ACP and non-ACP imports as much as to reduce it
to unity or below unity in column E of Table 20. This is called here ne-
gative preference redundancy. In other words, the preferential tariff is
not effective because it is not high enough to enable the ACP exporter
to become competitive in relation to other exporters in the donor market.
The third possibility where a preferential tariff is not considered redun-
dant involves by those items for which this tariff enables the ACP ex-
porters to compensate for their price disadvantage and become competi-
tive on the Common Market in comparison to exporters from other devel-
oping countries. In this case the price ratios before tariffs (column C)
turn from above unity to below unity (after tariffs, column E). Such
cases are however less frequent. Out of sixteen selected items in Table
20 only four items (vanilla, bovine meat prepared, cocoa butter and
canned pineapples) in 1977 and only one (canned pineapples) in 1982
proved to have had a so-called zero preference redundancy. In some
other products (palm oil, vanilla) exported by ACP countries in 1982 for
instance, preferences helped to converge higher ACP prices and lower
non-ACP prices to almost unity ratios. In these cases the imports from
the ACP countries were more expensive than those from the remaining
developing countries before tariffs but preferential tariffs made the for-
mer cheaper or almost equal in price compared to those of non-ACP ex-
porters. It is in these cases where preferential trading is supposed to
be effective. In the other two cases where a positive or negative pref-
erence redundancy can be observed, either it is not at all needed for
enabling the ACP exporters to become competitive with the exporters
from other developing countries or it is ineffective because it is by far
lower than the difference between the prices of the two competitors.
In both the years (1977 and 1982) for which the data on import prices
and preferential tariffs were examined the number of import goods hav-
ing positive and negative preference redundancy available to ACP ex-
porters to the EC is fairly balanced (Table 20). Goods for which pre-
ferential tariffs were found positively redundant in 1977 as well as in
1982 were canned tuna, cocoa paste, cocoa butter, canned pineapples,
aluminium oxide, goat skin leather and other tropical hard wood. Here
the ACP exports had a definite price advantage over the non-ACP ex-
ports from the Third World and even the removal of preferences would
not have impaired their competitiveness. Goods where tariff preferences
could by no means outweigh price disadvantages of ACP exporters in
both of the years were prawns & shrimps, beans and cloves. ACP prices
of these products were sometimes twice as high as those of other devel-
oping countries. Without tariff increases imposed on non-ACP exporters
such big price disadvantages could not have been compensated. The fact
that in spite of the ineffectiveness of preferences in these cases ACP
countries could nevertheless export to the EC indicates that, either ad-
ditional quantitative regulations (tariff quotas) exist or that the products

























































































































































































































Source: EC [c]; Eurostat [a, 1977, 1982].ACP competitiveness measured in this sense is, however, not a function
of preferential tariffs only. This is quite obvious in the cases of mol-
luscs and tropical hard wood in our sample (Table 20). In both of them
the EC preferential tariffs for ACP exporters remained constant between
1977 and 1982. But in the former case its position changed from a nega-
tive redundancy in 1977 to a positive redundancy in 1932 as a result of
independent changes in the prices of ACP and non-ACP exports. Quite
the opposite of this happened in the latter case. Tropical hard wood
offered by the ACP suppliers in 1982 was more expensive than in 1977
whereas that supplied by the other developing countries became much
cheaper during the same period. As a result the preferential tariff for
the ACP exporters became ineffective. Both kinds of preference redun-
dancy characterise in so far a waste of resources as they are either not
needed or fail to fulfill their function of promoting the exports of the
beneficiaries.
Since ACP preferential margins which are mostly equal to GATT-negotia-
ted tariffs remain usually constant over a period of many years it is the
relative prices of the ACP and non-ACP exporters and their changes
which influence the ACP competitiveness on the Common Market. In order
to improve it therefore attention has to be paid to those factors which
have an impact on the price level of ACP exports such as availability
and costs of inputs, production techniques, marketing, transportation,
warehousing and the level of exchange rate vis-a-vis the competitors.
Most of these fall in the domain of domestic economic policy of the ACP
countries and are discussed in the following chapter. This however
should not leave the impression that ACP exports are significantly more
expensive than the competing exports from the other developing coun-
tries. Statistical tests on the relative prices of 1977 as well as 1982 gi-
ven in column C of Table 20 did not reject the hypothesis (even at a
very high level of significance of .5 per cent) that they were not dif-
ferent from unity. This means that though on the average ACP prices
were higher than the prices of their competitors, the deviations around
the average price ratios in both the years were so high that a systematic
and hence a significant price difference could not be detected.
3. Erosion of Preference Margins
a. GSP-lnduced Erosion
ACP countries frequently complain about the erosion of their special pre-
ferences resulting from the broader product coverage and tariff cuts in
the GSP as well as from the implementation of MFN tariff cuts negotiated
in the Tokyo Round. No doubt both of these sources of preference ero-
sion do exist. However, it is important to note that they are related
more to the legal conditions of market access than to their effectiveness.
With regard to the GSP the main area of preference erosion lies in the
realm of processed agricultural products which have been increasingly
included in the list of GSP-eligible products. Whereas in 1971 only 145
items were granted GSP treatment, in 1983 they were as many as 338.
Most of the increments in product coverage were achieved between 1975and 1977 (296 items), which reflects the intention of the Community to
compensate the seven Asian Commonwealth countries (1) for the loss of
Commonwealth preferences which expired by 1978 due to the accession of
the UK. Parallel to the enlarged product coverage in processed agricul-
tural items GSP preferential tariffs were partly reduced so that the
depth of tariff cut became larger (2).
Except for plywood and veneer, where tariff quotas in the GSP have
been introduced in order to protect ACP trade interests, the manufac-
turing sector is a field where ACP preference margins have been dis-
mantled not because of GSP improvements but because of the implementa-
tion of the GSP itself. However, neither anglophone ACP countries under
the relatively liberal Commonwealth preferences on the UK market prior
to 1975 nor the francophone Yaounde associates under the reciprocal
Yaounde preferences on the EC market could make effective use of pre-
ferences for manufactures. Therefore the GSP cannot be supposed to
have contributed to the reduction of the share of ACP countries in EC
manufactured markets. In fact, the erosion issue centers on tropical
agricultural products and their processing, and here the ACP countries
compete mainly with the ASEAN countries. It is the ASEAN group to
which improvements in agricultural product coverage of the GSP were
granted, and it is this group which increased its agricultural exports of
competing products during 1974 and 1980 to the Community by a higher
rate than did the ACP group [Langhammer, forthcoming, Table 1],
Thus the question whether ACP preferential market access suffered from
erosion of tariff preferences can best be answered by calculating ACP
preference margins vis-a-vis competing ASEAN suppliers and their chan-
ges before and after the first Lome convention. For this purpose the
core group of ACP countries consisting of the Yaounde associates were
chosen as reference countries for ASEAN suppliers. Commonwealth pre-
ferences were not taken into account and the comparison for the Com-
monwealth members Malaysia and Singapore was confined to the remaining
eight EC members. The results of weighted preference margins with and
without GSP treatment in 1974 and 1980, respectively, denote the GSP-
induced erosion of ACP preferences in the two reference years (Table
21). They show that in 1974 ACP preferences vis-a-vis Singapore in
about thirty sample items would have amounted at the maximum to 5.1
per cent without the GSP but were diminished by 3.7 percentage points
or 73 per cent because of the GSP. Erosions emerged also vis-a-vis the
Philippines by 1.6 percentage points or 47 per cent of the MFN rate
without GSP application. In the case of Malaysia the GSP effect was con-
siderably smaller, and it did not exist in the cases of Indonesia and
Thailand.
(1) India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Singapore, Hong
Kong.
(2) There is a vast literature on the EC GSP scheme and its effects. For
recent evaluations with special reference to agricultural products see
Menzler-Hokkanen [forthcoming] and Langhammer [forthcoming]. For
a general evaluation of the EC GSP scheme see Langhammer, Sapir
[ forthcoming].Table 21 - Weighted Average Preference Margins (a) of ACP Agricultural
Exports vis-a-vis Competing ASEAN Products on EC 9 Mar-


























(a) The weights are the EC 9 values of
ASEAN countries in the respective tariff
























Source: EC [c]; Eurostat [a]; own calculations.
The 1980 figures reveal that during the second half of the seventies MFN
rates decreased except in the cases of the Philippines and Thailand
where MFN rates and hence hypothetical ACP preference margins slightly
increased because of a changing export composition. On the whole the
GSP has dismantled ACP preference margins. At the maximum preferen-
ces were eroded fully (Singapore); at the minimum by 0.5 percentage
points or 11 per cent of the MFN tariff (Indonesia).
b. CATT Tariff Cut-Induced Erosion
The change in average weighted preference margins between 1974 and
1980 is the combined effect of three factors: changes in MFN rates
(without GSP) due to the GATT negotiations, changes in GSP prefer-
ential tariffs and changes in weights (product composition effect). Dis-
regarding the latter effect which is relatively small the contribution of
the MFN tariff cut to the shrinkage of ACP preference margins is denot-
ed by the tariff changes during 1974 and 1980 "without GSP" (Table 21).
This effect has dominated the erosion of the ACP preferences vis-a-vis
Indonesia and Malaysia and comprised such goods as tea, cocoa beans
and coffee beans. As sources of erosion the MFN cuts and the GSP im-
provement were balanced vis-a-vis Singapore, whereas for the Philip-
pines GSP improvements were important. Solely vis-a-vis Thailand, whose
agricultural exports depend mainly on tapioca the ACP countries did not
suffer from preference erosion. Since exclusive MFN tariff cuts in theTokyo Round were negotiated for a much smaller number of tropical items
(1) than GSP preferences, one may be inclined to give the GSP conces-
sions a higher weight as a source of erosion. However, such a view ne-
glects that the three "classical" tropical products (tea (2), coffee and
cocoa beans) which were excluded from the GSP (3) but enjoyed MFN
cuts are important export items for ACP and have become sizeable items
for ASEAN competitors. For example, Indonesia's coffee exports to the
EC amounted to 12 per cent of the ACP export volume in 1980 compared
to only 7 per cent in 1974. Similar gains can be observed in the share of
Malaysia's cocoa exports. However, as opposing trends can be observed
for tea, it remains open whether the unquestioned erosion of ACP pref-
erences had a negative incidence on ACP exports or not. Other supply-
induced factors which became effective at the same time when prefei—
ences were dismantled may have been important as well. Neither unit
value comparisons and their changes nor the performance of Yaounde
associates on the UK market after the end of Commonwealth preferences
[Langhammer, forthcoming] (4) provide convincing evidence for the con-
clusion that it was the erosion of preferences which worsened the com-
petitive position of ACP countries on the EC market compared to that of
developing countries enjoying either MFN cuts or GSP preferences. The
relatively low initial level of tariffs and the market imperfections may
have suppressed an effective incidence of shrinking preference margins.
4. Tariff Savings and Import Price Reductions
a. Income Effects instead of Trade Effects
The effectiveness of preferences depends not only on production cost
differentials between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries but also on the
fact whether tariff cuts resulting from the introduction of preferences
are passed on to those who demand the product, i.e. in general not the
traders acting as intermediaries only but the private consumers or the
(1) In late 1976 the EC agreed in the Tokyo Round on a package of ta-
riff cuts for about twenty products most of which (spices, for in-
stance) also enjoyed preferential treatment under the GSP. They
came into force already on 1 January 1977 as a concession for non-
ACP developing countries.
(2) In packings exceeding 3 kg.
(3) Except non-ACP LLDCs which, however, were marginal suppliers of
the three items (see p. 18).
(4) In the heat of discussion on ACP preference margins and their ero-
sion it has often been neglected that a reverse situation happened
after the end of Commonwealth preferences in the sense that the
francophone ACP countries gained a duty-free access to the UK mar-
ket due to the UK accession. Thus, after 1978 the comparative tariff
treatment of Asian Commonwealth developing countries and franco-
phone African countries on the UK market turned to the advantage
of the latter. This reversal to the detriment of the former could not
be outweighed by the extension of the EC GSP scheme to the UK
replacing the Commonwealth preferences.50
domestic entrepreneurs processing the imports. No trade effects are like-
ly to occur if the importer or the exporter keeps the tariff savings for
himself. This happens if the importer leaves the price for the consumer
unchanged after the introduction of preferences or if the exporter raises
his price by the amount of the preference margin. Instead of a trade
effect, then, an income effect takes place which in the former case ac-
crues to the importer and in the latter case to the exporter. It is, how-
ever, more likely that income gains - if they occur - are divided be-
tween the exporter who raises the export price by a part of the tariff
reduction and the importer who takes the rest of it. The exact distribu-
tion of income gains depends on the supply and demand elasticities, in
other words on the relative bargaining power of the exporters versus
the importers.
Since the various tariff quotas of GSP have to be exhausted within one
year, what is important for the income effect in practice is the informa-
tion level of importers and exporters about the fact whether a specific
shipment load will receive preferences or not. The lower the information
level of the exporter compared to that of the importer, the more likely it
is that the importer receives the lion's share of the income gain.
A separate question is whether it is reasonable to assume an income ef-
fect of preferences only instead of a trade effect. If we assume that
export prices are not increased by the exporting developing country
following the introduction of preferential tariffs (1) and if we leave aside
the intensity of competition among the importers a major determinant of
pocketing tariff savings is the amount of uncertainty to which the impor-
ter is exposed. If preferences - as in the GSP for sensitive products -
are confined to rapidly exhausted quotas and if the greyhound system
holds for importers (first-come/first-served basis), then an individual
importer is uncertain whether he will receive preferences or not. In set-
ting his prices under such conditions of uncertainty he is likely to pro-
ceed as if he is going to import across MFN tariffs. That means that any
preference he does get is pocketed by him.
b. ACP Preferences and Tariff Savings
In contrast to the analysis of theoretical determinants of distribution of
income gains through tariff savings a straightforward empirical test of
its relevance for the ACP group is not possible simply because of the
unavailability of published import price statistics after tariffs. Thus, a
comparison between prices for goods originating from anglophone ACP
(1) This assumption is not heroic. There is not a full-employment situa-
tion in the developing countries so that exporters do not face in-
creasing factor costs because of a preference-induced rising demand
from the donor countries. Furthermore, in processed agricultures
and manufactures where preferences are relevant developing coun-
tries supply mostly standardized products supplied by many LDCs.
Price competition is therefore high among LDCs and importers do
have a large number of options to procure goods from everywhere.
This reduces the monopoly power of individual exporting countries
largely.51
countries on the EC 6 market prior to 1975, when they were charged the
full MFN rate, and the prices after that cannot be made.
Therefore some plausibility arguments are given below:
- quotas exist for ACP countries only in specific items where price ef-
fects and hence trade, effects are ruled out (beef, sugar, rum etc.).
Therefore, the above cited uncertainty argument for the importer,
whether he receives preferential treatment for preference-eligible goods
or not, does in general not hold for imports from ACP countries. Un-
less the importer fails to meet origin rules requirements, preferences
will be granted on an open-ended basis. Pricing as under MFN con-
ditions because of uncertainties does not seem to be therefore relevant
in the ACP case.
- ACP countries mostly export standardized commodities competing with
products from non-ACP sources. If these products are finished goods
(e.g. canned fruits, canned fish) it is rather likely that intensive
competition among sale stores on the retail level in food products will
lead to the transfer of tariff cuts into price cuts. The evidence of
intensive competition in retail food trade is offered by very small mar-
gins of profit.
- various ACP products, some of which are "core" items (coffee, cocoa,
lumber), are processed in the donor countries so that the import price
is only a part of the consumer's price. If this part is very small,
countervailing price trends on the local
1 processing stages may out-
weigh import price reductions. If, in addition, products originating
from ACP sources are blended with products from non-ACP sources as
it is the case with coffee, the preference effect becomes diffuse (1).
- intermediate goods used for industrial processing such a vegetable
fibres often face a price inelastic demand because of technologically
determined indivisibilities (fixed input coefficients in the production
function). In this case lower import prices as a result of preferences
will not induce additional demand but will stabilize demand in the sense
that substitution through synthetic products will be postponed.
- importers may pursue a "mixed-pricing" strategy between first orders
where tariff savings are pocketed and repeat orders where price dis-
counts are offered to the consumer to be paid from the tariff savings.
Thus, in spite of savings accruing to the importer on intra-marginal
(1) An analysis of interconnections between cif-prices for coffee and
West German retail prices for coffee revealed that only 37 per cent
of import price changes was shifted to the retail price level which
was the relevant for the consumer. For cocoa this percentage was
even lower. Furthermore, cif-prices for raw coffee and raw cocoa
from ACP countries and from Latin America - as the reference area -
ran rather synchronously in the past (elasticities: 0.97 and 0.78,
respectively), so that changes in ACP prices due to tariff discrimi-
nation would have probably been compensated by equivalent price
changes of Latin American substitutes. In this respect the conver-
ging effect of international commodity agreements on prices of goods
originating from beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries should not be
neglected [Langhammer, 1979, pp. 99-106].52
imports, trade effects become effective at the margin because of subsi-
dization of marginal imports.
- in agreements on the effectiveness of preferences in terms of trade
diverted from non-ACP countries to ACP countries it is often neglected
that this effect cannot become effective because neither the ACP bene-
ficiaries nor non-beneficiaries can compete with domestic products.
Such a case is constituted for instance in the case of tea bags (CCT
0902 A). Though a preference margin of 5 per cent exists in favour of
ACP countries no West German imports occur in this item. This is ex-
plained by the fact that tea from various origins are usually blended
before being packed into bags. In order to meet this consumer prefer-
ence tea from various ACP countries would have to be assembled in an
ACP country to be packed to tea bags there. This is neither economi-
cally viable because of the low price prevailing for tea bags nor tech-
nically possible in the ACP context. In addition, transportation costs,
costs of packing and the rather strict German labeling regulations for
finished goods packings are further barriers against shifting the first
processing stage to a tea-exporting ACP country (1).
To sum up, though clear cut empirical tests on tariff savings and income
gains at retail and wholesale levels are not feasible without micro-data, it
does not appear that the effectiveness of ACP preferences has been seri-
ously impeded by tariff pocketing. In sectors, where ACP countries oc-
cupy relatively strong trading positions, competition between traders in
the EC countries is strong as well. Any state intervention to the detri-
ment of newcomers in trading and in favour of established traders could,
however, lead to monopoly rents and could impede the transfer of tariff
cuts into price cuts. The more often such impediments would take place,
the more importers would represent the interests of domestic manufactu-
rers (2).
5. Origin Rules and Their Impact on ACP Exports
a. Implementation of Origin Rules
Origin rules are a complement to unequal treatment through regionally
specified tariff quotas. Once an importing country starts dividing its
trading partners into more privileged, less privileged and non-privileged
ones, as measured by degrees of deviations from the MFN tariff, origin
rules have to be introduced. Otherwise a trade deflection occurs which
means imports from countries which have already exhausted their quotas
(1) This suggestion was made by the executives of the Wirtschaftsver-
einigung GroB- und AuBenhandel, Hamburg e.V.
(2) Such privileges to established traders representing domestic manu-
facturers have been granted in France under the GSP for very sen-
sitive textiles. It is argued in this connection that the French Mi-
nistry of Industry has a decisive influence on delaying the granting
of technical visa and licenses to certain importers in order to ensure
that French tariff quotas are used solely by importers who represent
domestic manufacturers [Weston et al., 1980, p. 83].53
via countries which have not exhausted their quotas or which enjoy
open-ended market access. This would make special preferences ineffec-
tive and would open additional export outlets for advanced developing
countries thus putting domestic producers of the importing country un-
der enhanced adjustment pressure.
The relevance of trade deflection is obvious in the case of ACP coun-
tries. They enjoy duty-free and open-ended market access for nearly all
products in the EC and are to a large extent unable to use it. On the
other hand, advanced developing countries of Latin America and particu-
larly of Asia can use the options of duty-free treatment under the GSP
only to the extent fixed by the Community through general safeguards,
ceilings and tariff quotas. Furthermore, successful non-ACP suppliers
are subjected to quantitative restrictions. The existence of highly com-
petitive and non-competitive suppliers facing different conditions of mar-
ket accessibility provides strong incentives to trade deflection. This
would practically lead to a shift of "finishing touch" activities to ACP
countries in order to profit from ACP preferences. These activities may
contribute to employ resources in ACP countries which would otherwise
remain idle and may thus support the developmental targets of the Lome
conventions. Yet the protection of its own domestic industries has been
given priority by the EC. Thus, minimum requirements of domestic value
added content in gross output have been fixed which are widely identical
with requirements set for other preferential arrangements (GSP, Mediter-
ranean preferences). The explicit ones determine that the cif value of
imported materials does not exceed an upper limit fixed as a percentage
of the ex factory value of the exported product (percentage criterion).
The implicit requirements constitute specific processing operations to be
carried out in the ACP country on the non-originating materials (process
criterion). The jump from a 4-digit CCCN heading to another one mostly
serves as the criterion of substantial processing, but not always. The so
called regulation lists A and B of the rule of origins enumerate the cases
where the tariff jump does not qualify a product for preferential treat-
ment because of insufficient processing and where even without a tariff
jump origin rule requirements are met because of substantial processing.
In contrast to origin rules fixed for GSP beneficiaries the ACP countries
have been granted two cumulation options which basically reduce the
restrictive nature of origin rules. Value added contents of several ACP
countries can be added together which encourages vertical specialization
and intra-ACP trade and second, inputs" imported from the Community
are considered as originating products (donor content rule). Whereas the
former option is not likely to have much impact because of the low in-
dustrialization level of the countries concerned and because of low level
of trade among each other (1), the latter may be more important. How-
ever, it has the stigma of "tied aid". No doubt the donor country con-
tent reduces the options of ACP countries to buy from the cheapest
sources of supply. However, the preferences are a non-negotiable unila-
teral concession and no recipient can complain about the real value of
the concession which is deflated by its tiedness.
(1) See for an exception Chapter VI, Chart 2.b. Domestic Value Added Content: Implications for ACP Countries
On the basis of an UNCTAD study in which the implicit value added re-
quirements for garments and woven cotton fabrics were transformed into
explicit value added shares (86 and 76 percent of the finished product)
[McQueen, 1982] comes to the conclusion that less advanced ACP coun-
tries are unable to meet such criteria.
In fact, Table 22 yields for twelve ACP countries at the end of the se-
venties that the recorded value added shares in gross output of manu-
facturing industries did not exceed 50 per cent for the majority of cases
(73 percent). This proportion was even worse some years ago [McQueen,
1982]. Out of the two most industrialised ACP countries, the Ivory Coast
and Kenya, only one industry (beverages) in the former exceeded the 50
per cent limit.
There are several factors responsible for this result. First, the ACP
countries at their given stage of industrialisation hardly possess verti-
cally integrated processing chains which would raise the domestic value
added content. Second, the import substitution policies pursued by most
of the ACP countries inhibit the establishment of local industries produ-
cing intermediates. Third, the distortion of factor prices in ACP coun-
tries through minimum wage legislation and interest rate ceilings favour
capital intensive techniques which lead to a high share of non-originating
inputs imported from industrialised economies. Fourth, also the goods
prices are distorted through tariffs and subsidies. Tariffs are highest in
finished goods and lowest for primary commodities. Capital goods can
often be imported duty free because of tax holidays conceded to foreign
investors (1). In terms of world market prices the domestic value added
sometimes turns out to be negative. Fifth, the donor country content
provision enhances the existing tendency of investors from EC countries
to apply the same labour saving techniques in ACP countries with which
they are familiar in their home countries. The above price policies as
well as the application of technical standards and norms used in the
home countries of foreign investors reinforce- this tendency.
Under these conditions one could expect that most of the ACP non-tradi-
tional exports have been denied preferential treatment in the EC because
of their not being in conformity with its rules of origin. But this is not
true. Though data on ACP exports to the EC market under MFN condi-
tions are not available, it seems that full tariff exemption has been con-
ceded to all ACP exports in privileged items. This is indicated by a few
ACP exports which are classified as GSP-receiving imports in the German
import statistics because the importers of these goods filled in the GSP
Form A instead of the movement certificate for preferential trade between
the EC and the ACP states. Hence, instead of special preferences the
GSP was applied. Though origin rules are even more rigid in the GSP
(lack of donor content), ACP exports could obviously jump over this
hurdle.
(1) See for an empirical evidence of goods and factor price distortions
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Source: UN [b, 1982, Vol. 1].56
Why this was possible in spite of the low value added content in gross
output can be explained by making references to the actual application of
the rules. In specific cases and under various conditions to be approved
by the Customs Cooperation Council established under the ACP agree-
ment exemptions from the rules of origin can be granted and have been
granted in practice.
c. Effects of the Donor Country Content Rule
The donor country content provision combines both a short-term deroga-
tion as well as a long-term impasse for ACP exporters.
The annually published Ivorian "Centrale de Bilans" allows for assessing
the importance of this cumulation provision combined with the ACP group
cumulation since intermediates used are disaggregated according to their
origin. Table 23 provides a breakdown of the value added content in
turnover, of the direction of sales and of the origin of inputs in manu-
facturing industries classified as exportables. The group "Franc-Zone
countries" comprises francophone ACP countries as well as France, so
that inputs and intermediates imported from this group and processed in
the Ivory Coast, fully meet the donor country content and/or the ACP
group cumulation provision.
Additionally, the group "other third countries" includes the rest of EC
members so that part of the inputs and intermediates from this source
can be added to the domestic value added too. As far as the value added
share is concerned the findings derived from Table 23 hold: except for
rubber, the shares do not exceed 50 per cent. On the other hand, how-
ever, the share of non-originating inputs (excluding intermediates)
amounts to less than 20 per cent at the maximum if we assume that in-
puts from other third countries originate from non-EC sources to the full
extent. However, this is rather unlikely.
Thus, in spite of the low value added shares, origin rules are mostly
fulfilled according to the percentage criterion and probably also accord-
ing to the process criterion. Without the donor country content rule ma-
ny Ivorian industries would fail to meet them. In general, the export
oriented Ivorian industries (food processing, wood processing, clothing
and rubber) are based on the processing of local inputs, whereas im-
ported inputs dominate in industries oriented towards domestic market.
This again reflects partly the impact of distortions. induced by trade
policy.
Are the rules of origin protectionist tools of the Community in the sense
that they inhibit ACP exports and if so, against whom are these tools
used by the Community? As long as no distinction can be made between
preference-receiving imports on the one hand and preference-eligible
imports from ACP countries which did not receive preferences on the
other hand, there is no direct answer to this question. But even if pre-
ference-eligible and preference-receiving imports from the ACP region
would be identical, there is evidence that rules of origin are protec-
tionist tools, not against ACP countries but against those third countries
which are excluded from both of the cumulation provisions. Such coun-tries are the non-EC industrialized economies and particularly the non-
ACP advanced developing countries. Fabrics cannot be exported from
Asian countries to ACP members in order to be processed there to cloth-
ing even if wage costs in the ACP group would make such a trade pro-
fitable. Since this holds generally, ACP countries are cut off from trans-
fers of technological and commercial know-how originating from advanced
developing countries and this is exactly what they need. Instead incen-
tives are provided by the donor country content rule to import advanced
technologies from the highly developed countries of the Community which
do not correspond to the factor endowment of ACP countries.
d. Implications for ACP Exporters
Whereas cost differentials between inputs from the EC and cheaper sub-
stitutes from non-EC sources may give rise to concern in the short run
as they are equal to an income transfer from the ACP group to the EC,
the long run implications of the donor country content provisions are
more serious. ACP countries become increasingly dependent on the EC
for their exports because inputs originating only from the EC can be
considered as originating products if the finished goods are to be ex-
ported to the EC. Rules of origin of potential third markets such as Ja-
pan or the USA will deny preferential treatment to these ACP exports
under their GSP. Finally, the division of labour with non-ACP advanced
developing countries which might be crucial as a development stimulant
for ACP countries, is impeded.
To conclude, as long as discriminatory preferences do exist, rules of
origin are indispensable for separating the beneficiaries from the non-
beneficiaries. In the ACP case, non-competitive ACP countries are neigh-
boured by competitive non-ACP countries whose labour' intensive indus-
tries threaten vulnerable domestic industries of the EC. In this respect
rules of origin, which require substantial transformation with value ad-
ded contents of more than 50 per cent, have the principal objective of
reducing incentives for trade deflection. Proceeding along this line means
to close possible loopholes for indirect exports of advanced developing
countries via ACP countries but unfortunately it also hampers potential
ACP exports. In order to achieve both targets, viz. the prevention of
indirect exports from NICs and the promotion of ACP exports, the donor
country content rule serves as a way out of this impasse. However, as it
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Source: MEF [1983]; own calculations.60
V. ACP Policy-Induced Barriers to ACP Export Growth and Export
Diversification
Internal price distortions are probably the most serious bottleneck to the
integration of ACP countries in the world economy because they inhibit
domestic producers to export goods with a factor mix which is commensu-
rate with the country's factor endowment. A sample of 31 developing
countries ranked by the World Bank [d] according to the degrees of
their price distortions in the seventies, denotes six ACP countries in the
lower half of the sample, viz. the Ivory Coast, Senegal, Jamaica,
Tanzania, Nigeria and Ghana. The latter three countries together with
Bangladesh had the highest amount of price distortions (1).
Price distortions in developing countries are a result of administered
prices for production factors through which labour is usually made more
costly and capital cheaper than what they would be under market condi-
tions. Further determinants of distortions in developing countries lie in
the realm of product pricing (tariffs and inflation) as well as in the
lacking adjustment of exchange rates to the changing differentials be-
tween domestic and international inflation. The latter determinant often
results in overvalued nominal exchange rates and hence in an apprecia-
tion of the local currency in real terms.
1. Factor Price Distortions
a. Minimum Wages
a. Labour Abundance and Labour Aristocracy
A relative abundance of unskilled labour is a common feature of Third
World countries and especially of those which are in the early stages of
development such as the ACP members. According to the traditional
theory of international trade these countries can improve their welfare if
they specialize in the production and export of those goods which make
an intensive use of this factor. Yet, in almost all of these countries the
employment of unskilled labour is subject to some form of minimum wage
regulations (2). Obviously the protection of the most vulnerable group of
workers has considerable political appeal because it is a visible expres-
sion of declared targets of many governments to achieve a greater de-
(1) The ranking does not show the wide range of the distortions between
for example the Ivory Coast on the one hand and Tanzania or Ghana
on the other. A recent study by Balassa [1982] concludes that the
so-called market-oriented ACP countries such as Botswana, the Ivory
Coast, Cameroon, Kenya, Malawi, Mauritius, Niger, Burkina Faso,
and Togo showed a better performance with regard to the response
to external shocks than the more interventionist or "etatist" coun-
tries which imposed a greater amount of policy distortions upon their
economies (Ethiopia, Benin, Ghana, Madagascar, Mali, Zambia,
Senegal, Sudan, Tanzania).
(2) Exceptions within the group of ACP countries are e.g. Ethiopia,
Nigeria, Somalia and Suriname [Starr, 1981, p. 11].61
gree of social justice and to improve the distribution of national income.
However, whether minimum wage fixing is an adequate method to reach
these targets is a controversial issue. The main objection against the use
of this policy instrument is that it will raise labour /capital price ratios
and will foster the introduction of labour saving techniques. While of-
fering wage rents to a relatively small group of the already employed
workers, which is defined here as labour aristocracy, minimum wage fix-
ing reduces employment opportunities for a majority of the unskilled la-
bourers.
Evaluation of the economic impact of minimum wages, however, faces con-
siderable empirical hurdles. Its impact on labour costs, prices, employ-
ment, investment and economic growth largely depends on their level and
effectiveness, especially in the long run when adjustments to increases
in labour productivity and general price level have to be made. None-
theless, some general comments on the importance of minimum wage legis-
lation for economic development in the ACP countries, especially the
African ones, are possible.
8. Minimum Wage Legislation in ACP Countries in Historical Perspective
Minimum wages are administered in almost all African ACP countries,
where they were introduced first by the colonial powers [Acharya, 1981;
Arrighi, 1973, p. 122]. At the end of the colonial period the leadership
of labour price was in the hands of the public sector. Here the wage
level was relatively very high and characterized by a big difference be-
tween wages of skilled and unskilled labour. This difference was caused
mainly by the efforts of the colonial powers to facilitate recruitment of
administrative staff from their own countries. For the same reason a si-
milar wage structure existed also in the private sector which was domi-
nated by foreign firms.
After independence a massive Africanisation began of the administrative
cadres of the public sector. For reasons of egalitarianism, however, it
was found to be politically untenable to pay lower salaries to the Afri-
cans while retaining the old pay scales for the ex-colonial expatriate
staff on which these countries were still dependent in the skill-intensive
technical government functions. In the private sector, foreign firms also
continued to pay their expatriates at the same high level as before.
Thus for the newly established African governments, it was easier to
meet the political pressure for reducing the massive income disparities
within the already employed labour force by raising wages at the bottom
of the pay scale than by reducing salaries at the higher levels. As a
result, during the first decade after independence earnings of workers
in the modern sector increased substantially.
However this wage policy resulted in some adverse economic consequen-
ces which soon became perceptible and can be summarized as follows (1):
- With rising minimum wages the already existing income differences be-
tween rural and urban areas increased leading to a massive migration
into towns and to increasing urban unemployment and poverty.
(1) For more detailed information see e.g. Malan [1981] and the litera-
ture cited there.62
- In most of these countries the public sector was and still is the largest
single employer. High and increasing minimum wages often followed by
corresponding increases in wages and salaries of the upper grade em-
ployees resulted in a swelling of government current expenditure and
decrease of government savings and investment. Further, this in-
creased the pressure on private enterprises to raise the level of their
wages and salaries.
- In the private sector minimum wage regulations have tended to increase
the substitution of unskilled labour by capital. Thus while ensuring a
relatively high standard of living for a comparatively small number of
urban workers, minimum wages have harmed the majority of unskilled
labourers because of their adverse influence on the employment crea-
tion.
- Last but not least, increasing unit labour costs called for increasing
protection of the nascent industries. This in turn biased industriali-
zation in favour of import-substituting activities while competitiveness
of export industries suffered.
Studies on wages in some anglophone African countries (e.g. Zambia)
confirm that wages paid by foreign firms did have an influence on the
wages in the rest of the economy [Knight, 1975], Usually these firms
are engaged in manufacturing and mining and therefore tend to use
highly capital-intensive technologies. This implies a high factor produc-
tivity, a low weight of labour costs in total costs and therefore a greater
willingness of the employers to concede high and increasing wages above
the minimum levels.
Thus, at the end of the seventies most of the African ACP members were
still maintaining the colonial heritage of a relatively high wage level. In
the following section the development of wages during the seventies is
discussed on the basis of some quantitative information.
y. Minimum and Real Wage Rates in the Seventies
During the seventies, especially after the first oil price shock in 1973
(see Section V.2.c.) inflation in the African ACP countries sharply ac-
celerated. In almost all the countries included in Table 24 minimum wages
were adjusted to rising prices as shown by the increases in the nominal
minimum wages, though they were not always sufficient to compensate for
inflation. The real minimum wage in these countries declined by 1.7 per
cent per year during the period 1970 - 1977. This decrease was much
more pronounced in the CAR (5.7 per cent), Zambia (6.6 per cent) and
Zaire (15.8 per cent). On the other hand in Kenya, Mali, and Mauretania
real minimum wages increased by an annual average rate of 1.5, 4.3 and
2.5 per cent, respectively. In Senegal and Tanzania they remained
constant during 1970-1977. The highest increase in minimum wages was
found in a non-African ACP country, viz. Papua New Guinea, where
they rose by 11.7 per cent per annum.
Besides the real minimum wages, the real wages paid in the manufactur-
ing sector also declined in a number of African ACP countries (Table
25). The biggest decline in 1970-1977 was in Ghana with an annual aver-
age rate of 11.7 per cent followed by Somalia (6.8 per cent), Rwanda63


























































































































































































































































































































Source: Starr [1981, pp. 189-193].
(4.1 per cent), Malawi (1970-1975: 3.7 per cent), Ethiopia (1970-1980:
3.4 per cent), Kenya (1970-1980: 2.7 per cent), the Ivory Coast
(1973-1980: 0.9 per cent), and Zimbabwe (1973-1979: 0.2 per cent). An
increase in the real wages was registered in Fiji (4.5 per cent), Jamaica
(4.2 per cent) and Mauritius (1970-1980: 2.6 per cent). It is interesting
to note that in Somalia and Ethiopia where the decline of real wages was
more pronounced, minimum wage regulations did not exist.Table 25 - Indices of Nominal and Real Wages per Worker in the Manu-
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anployees in ISIC 3, divided by average number of employees;
and Mauritius divided by average number of persons engaged.
Source: UN [b].
Whether the decline in real wages has actually contributed to the greater
use of labour in production is difficult to assess only on the basis of
this information because the decrease of real wages may reflect a decline
in productivity of labour. What is essential in order to assess the distor-
tional impact of wage changes, is the information on their relation to
changes in national income per capita. In Table 26 therefore the develop-
ment of per capita real wages in manufacturing is compared with the
growth of per capita real income adjusted for changes in the external
terms of trade. The latter variable can be regarded as a rough proxy of
the overall productivity. Thus if for example real wages increase more
than the adjusted real income it would mean that the cost of labour has
risen more than the productivity of labour and that the profits have65
Table 26 - Annual Average Rates of Growth of Real Wages in Manufac-
turing (a) and of Terms of Trade Adjusted GDP per
































































IPI = Import Price Index, POP = Population. - (c) 1970-1973. - (d) 1976-1980. -
(e) 1976-1979. - (f) 1970-1977.- (g) 1973-1980
1979. - (j) 1970-1979. - (k) 1973-1979. - (1)
(n) 1974-1978. - (o) 1971-1978.
. - (h) 1970-1972. -
1975-1977
(i) 1977-
- (m) 1971-1974. -
Source: UN [b]; World Bank [e]; own calculations.
gone down. As Table 26 shows, such a development occurred in Gambia,
Rwanda, Fiji and Jamaica.
The deterioration of the real income of wage earners in the sample coun-
tries as a consequence of decline in real wages during the seventies
must have increased the employment and profits. Therefore the climate
for .private investment must also have improved. However, whether the
decline in real wages during the seventies was sufficient to compensate
its increases during the sixties cannot be easily assessed. In a World
Bank analysis [d, p. 62; see also Agarwala, 1984], which is based on
the same indicator as used here but takes into account other "qualitative
information" and longer-term effects of rapid increases in wages in the
sixties, Ghana, Kenya and the Ivory Coast are qualified as countries
with medium or highly distorted prices of labour.
Given the small size of the manufacturing sector in ACP countries, it is
however questionable whether it is this sector rather than the leading
public sector or the large agricultural sector which determines the wage
level in these countries.
6. Wage Costs in ACP Countries in International Comparison
ACP countries face a number of locational disadvantages in export-orien-
ted production compared with many other developing countries. Among66
other things, what determines the desire of foreign investors to establish
production facilities in ACP countries is not the wage cost difference
between the EC and the ACP countries but the difference between the
latter and other LDCs (1). This is because ACP countries compete with
non-ACP developing countries where unskilled labour is abundant as
well.
Given the obvious shortages of wage data and their inconsistencies, the
comparison between wage costs in ACP countries and other LDCs under-
taken in the following should be interpreted with due caution. For that
purpose labour costs per unit of gross output in the textile industry of
those ACP countries where data were available and of some medium-size
and middle-income competing countries were compared. The textile indus-
try as a fairly homogeneous industry has been chosen firstly because it
is one of the leading export industries of many developing countries ab-
sorbing unskilled labour and secondly because it changes its location
rapidly in response to wage cost differentials among developing coun-
tries. Because of the latter characteristic the textile industry has ceased
to be the major export industry of the NICs such as South Korea,
Taiwan or Singapore and has shifted to other middle-income countries in
Latin America, Asia, and North Africa. Therefore textile exporters of
the "second generation" such as Colombia, the Philippines and Tunisia
and also small open economies such as the Central American countries
Costa Rica and Guatemala who are closely linked to an industrialised
market were selected as reference countries.
The comparison yields a fairly homogeneous result (Table 27). The aver-
age wage cost content in gross output was roughly speaking higher by
more than 30 per cent in ACP countries than in the reference countries.
This difference remained stable during the seventies in spite of technol-
ogy-induced decreases in the wage cost content in both groups of coun-
tries over time. The only exception was Mauritius which is the most suc-
cessful ACP exporter of textiles and where wage costs per unit of output
declined in line with the reference countries.
Nonetheless, it may be concluded that though unskilled labour in ACP
countries seems to be at least as abundant as in the reference countries,
there is no evidence that they were more attractive as an investment
location than other developing countries because' of lower wages.
Two observations underline this conclusion. First, "generous" labour
legislation in francophone African countries seems to have led to a short-
er weekly working time than in other developing countries (2). Second,
it has been estimated that for instance in the Ivory Coast additional so-
(1) This aspect has been widely neglected in the study commissioned by
the EC on selection criteria of export industries in African associated
countries. Furthermore, it considers nominal wage rates and not
wage costs per unit of output which would be more relevant
[EG, b].
(2) According to the UN Yearbook of Industrial Statistics operatives in
the Cameroonian and Malagasy (Madagascar) textile ii dustry worked
2080 and 2225 hours respectively in 1978, whereas working time in
Guatemala, Hong Kong, the Philippines and South K-rea was 2307,
2760, 2564 and 2385, respectively.67
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in ISIC 321. - (b) Excluding the extreme cases of Scmalia in
and Papua New Guinea and Seychelles in 1975 and 1977, respec-
Source: UN [b].
cial charges on wages amounted to 45 per cent of wages for African la-
bour in 1975 [den Tuinder, 1978, Table SA 89, p. 428]. Indeed, it
seems to be a colonial heritage in some ACP countries that social fringe
benefits granted to the labour aristocracy have reached an amount which
is incompatible with the overall income level of the countries and which
the countries can afford only by shifting the costs to the mass of unem-
ployed people in the rural and urban areas.68
b. Low-Interest Rate Policies
a. The Case for Interest Rate Ceilings
Physical capital is a scarce factor of production in most of the ACP
countries. Domestic savings are - given the low income level - too low.
Opportunity cost of savings is often relatively high because of high in-
flation. Domestic financial markets are narrow, rudimentary and not open
to everybody. Access to private short-term world capital markets is very
limited because of insufficient creditworthiness of ACP countries. In
many cases the flow of private long term capital from abroad (foreign in-
vestments) is confined to the exploitation of natural resources. Conse-
quently it does not lead to. much employment in the secondary sector.
Finally, the access to development aid, especially of soft loans (IDA
credits), is adversely affected by unforeseeable political disputes on
"burden sharing" between the donor countries. The tension on the latest
7th IDA replenishment bears witness to this point. Thus, one would
expect higher interest rates on the local markets than abroad in order to
- counteract the outflow of expatriates' remittances and savings,
- give incentives to increased domestic savings,
- reduce the import intensity and hence the physical capital intensity of
local industrial production in the long run,
- discourage the introduction of labour saving technological progress,
- stop the drain of financial assets into unproductive physical assets in
the case of inflationary pressures,
- attract the financing of foreign investments through external funds
and hence to shift the risk of failure entirely to the investor instead
of allowing the host country to participate in the risk through subsi-
dized local funds,
- avoid credit rationing because of excess demand for capital at interest
rates below equilibrium level,
- foster viable export industries which employ the most abundant pro-
duction factor, i.e., unskilled labour.
But in reality all these countries have followed low interest rate policies
- to promote investment and thus growth,
- to avoid destabilizing effects of frequent interest rate changes on
small credit markets,
- to keep the debt services low (1).
As in other low-income countries, the public sector in ACP countries
is usually the major borrower. Therefore low interest rates are justified
with the need to limit budget deficits and to maintain the state's flex-
ibility in financing development programs.
(1) The pros and cons of low interest rates in francophone African
Franc-Zone members whose CFA-Francs is tied through a fixed cur-
rency peg to the French Franc, were extensively discussed in 1972,
when the IMF and the World Bank found the monetary policy of the
West African Monetary Union (UMOA) to be inadequate for the
reasons cited above [BCEAO, No. 203, 1973].69
8. Empirical Evidence and Consequences of Interest Rate Rigidities
These arguments have been attacked by economists as frequently as they
have been defended and implemented by politicians in developing coun-
tries in general and in ACP countries in particular. A recent study on
interest-rate policies of the seventies in West African countries [Leite,
1982] provides evidence for what the World Bank admonished for the
francophone African countries and Kenya [World Bank, g, pp. 362-365],
i.e. interest rates have been generally fixed at a lower level than in
France and the UK, which are the major trading partners and the major
sources of capital inflow. Furthermore, interest rates have remained re-
latively stable. Only recently they were adjusted upward in line with the
higher nominal interest rates on world capital markets. Domestic inflation
is higher than the nominal interest rates so that real interest rates
(lending as well as savings deposit rates) turn out to be negative. What
is most crucial, however, is that such an outcome does not emerge epi-
sodically but over a longer period. Table 28 shows that this holds at
least for the second half of the seventies in two francophone currency
unions in West and Central Africa as well as for the anglophone West
African countries. Because of high domestic inflation the level of real
interest rates in Ghana was subject to disruptive changes, but it re-
mained negative throughout the whole period.
Though in the UMOA the central bank discount rate was strongly raised
in the early eighties, the real savings deposit rates (for instance in the
Ivory Coast in 1982) remained negative which raised the opportunity
costs for private savings.
The implications of such long-term distortions for the export acitivites of
the ACP countries concerned can be summarized as follows.
- The capital intensity of production is fostered by low interest rate
policies over a long period which results in deterioration of competi-
tiveness of exportables on world markets. This seems to have hap-
pened in the West and Central African ACP countries.
- Lower rates of interest in the long run favour imported investment
goods because they tend to be of longer life than similar domestic
investment goods and hence are financed by long term lending
[World Bank, g]. As already discussed, this is an incentive to de-
crease the share of domestically originating inputs and to apply a
labour saving technology which is inappropriate given the abundance
of unskilled labour in ACP countries. Excess capacities and a protec-
tion structure which provide additional shelter to the scarce factor,
viz. capital, are then inevitable consequences.
Lending rates which in real terms are lower than the rates of return on
the majority of projects requiring capital will result in a crowding out of
viable projects because of credit rationing. Thus, export diversification
strategies are impeded by wasting scarce resources. Instead of the mar-
ket the administration takes decisions on the allocation of the funds
which may be misleading because of distorted price signals. The inflow
of foreign equity capital for new export oriented and labour intensive
branches and the promotion of domestic savings are widely accepted tar-
gets for ACP countries. However, just the opposite has happened. The
inward looking and relatively capital as well as import intensive branches
financed through subsidized loans raised on local financial markets have70
Table 28 - Interest rates in France and in Selected West and Central
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received strong incentives from low interest rate policies in a number of
ACP countries. While many other developing countries seem to have been
aware of the incompatibility between interest rate subsidization and ex-
port diversification strategies [Fischer, 1982] and have consequently
liberalized their financial markets, the ACP countries as shown above im-
plicitly impose taxes on their exports through an inappropriate level of
interest.
2. Goods Price Distortions
a. Tariffs
a. The Role of Tariffs in Industrialisation Policies of Low-Income Coun-
tries
Tariffs play an important role as an instrument of industrialisation policy
in virtually all developing countries. Since import tariffs raise the do-
mestic prices of tariff ridden products they reduce the domestic demand
for imports and provide an incentive to engage in the domestic produc-
tion of substitutes for imports.
This holds in general. Tariffs in the context of low-income developing
countries, however, have a special meaning to be derived from their in-
dustrialisation level and budget constraints. To begin with the indus-
trialisation level, low-income countries in the early stage of industriali-
sation have a very small and less diversified manufacturing sector. Pro-
duction focuses on the final stage of processing (i.e. assembling activi-
ties) with strong backward linkages to foreign suppliers of inputs. Do-
mestically produced finished goods replace imports of only those com-
peting goods which face very high cost disadvantages because of trans-
portation and higher labour charges in highly developed countries.
Tariffs imposed on competing imports are often redundant but are levied
for revenue purposes. The same is true for tariffs imposed on imports
which do not compete with local production. This stage of inward-looking
industrialisation based on infant industry argument (1) is often called
"natural" import substitution and implies a few distortions only. How-
ever, because of small market size this stage does not last very long and
import substitution becomes a part of the policy with systematic distor-
tions in favour of import competing domestic industries. This stage may
be called import substitution or policy excessive import substitution.
This policy has thus become an ingredient of development policies in
(1) According to this argument temporary protection is necessary be-
cause the market process fails to take account of the full social re-
turns from investment in new industries. The main problem is seen
in externalities associated with the learning process. However, if
there are divergences between private and social benefits, which
prevent private investment from reaching a social optimum, the ap-
propriate policy calls for compensation through subsidies rather than
through tariffs because subsidies give a better guarantee that the
social benefits like teaching activities are actually supplied [Baldwin,
1969].72
which tariffs change their functions from being mainly budgetary to pro-
tectionist tools. Under this policy costly tariff protection is granted to
old industries, which do not have the productivity growth of competing
imports, and to new industries having excess capacities and' relatively
high absorption of capital for the protected market. At this stage the
structure of tariffs - as it will be shown below - becomes at least as
important a tool of protection as the average level of tariffs. Many ACP
countries are in this stage of economic development.
B. Nominal and Effective Rates of Tariff Protection in ACP Countries
The tax burden on imports in ACP countries in many cases is higher
than is shown by the import duties. This is due to the fact that a num-
ber of additional fiscal charges is levied on them (1). On the other
hand, however, a study on the difference between average nominal tariff
rates and the rates of effective duty collection (share of collected import
charges in total value of imports) in 19 ACP countries yields that effec-
tive duty collection amounted only to 46 per cent of average tariffs in
the mid-seventies with a range between 71 per cent (Malawi) and 10
per cent (Bahamas) (2). This large discrepancy stems from tax holidays
for investors which are allowed in many ACP countries to import inputs
free of import charges under the various investment codes. Such tariff
exemptions widen the gaps between tariffs on intermediates and finished
goods which are an integral part of tariff schedules (tariff escalation) in
all the ACP countries. Both the tariff structure and the practice of ta-
riff exemptions point out one of the main elements of import substitution
policies in ACP countries, viz. the high amount of protection given to
the domestic value added process. This is defined as effective rate of
protection. The higher the tariffs on finished goods compared to those
on inputs, the higher will be the effective rate of protection in compa-
rison to the nominal tariff rate. Such a difference between value added
(1) The most important individual fiscal duty in many African ACP coun-
tries has been part of a two-tiers tariff scheme comprising the fiscal
duty ("droit fiscal" in the West African Customs Union (WACU) or
"droit d'entree" in the Central African Customs and Economic Union
(CACEU)) and the customs duty (droit de douane). The fiscal duty
is generally higher and - during the time of the "reverse" Yaounde
and Arusha association agreements - was imposed on all imports,
whereas imports from the EC countries were exempted from the
custom duty. The introduction of the two-tiers system aimed at
bridging the trade-off between the requirements of reciprocal pre-
ferences and the need for revenues from import duties. It has for a
long time been attacked by the USA as being discriminatory and
GATT-violating and it became obsolete when the non-reverse Lome
agreements were launched. However, in multilateral GATT negotia-
tions the two-tiers system has maintained its importance as ACP
countries offer concessions on the basis of the lower customs duty
only and not on the sum of customs and fiscal duties.
(2) The countries are Bahamas, Benin, Burundi, Gabon, Ghana, Jamai-
ca, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra
Leone, Somalia, Suriname, Togo, Burkina Faso, and Zaire
[Tymowski, forthcoming].73
measured at domestic prices (plus tariffs) and at world market prices is
furthermore an increasing function of the share of inputs in gross out-
put. As discussed in Chapter IV most of the ACP countries are still in
the stage of low domestic value added content in gross output, which is
itself a result of discrimination against domestic intermediate industries
through tariff escalation.
Under such circumstances it is not surprising that many studies on no-
minal and effective rates of protection in ACP countries show a rather
homogenous pattern of effective rates of protection higher than the
nominal rates.
As Table 29 shows, all industrial activities in Nigeria for instance are
protected at a higher rate than is indicated by the nominal tariff rate on
the final output. Also in Tanzania effective rates of protection for fifteen
out of a total of seventeen industries are higher than the nominal rates.
In Kenya, in 11 out of 19 industries the effective protection is higher
than the nominal protection. This also means that the other industries
are taxed according to the existing tariff structure. Further empirical
evidence on effective rates of protection in ACP countries is provided in
another study on the members of the CACEU [Langhammer, 1978, p.
113] in which the rates were calculated for seven so-called "taxe unique"
industries (1) of the member countries Cameroon, Congo, CAR and Ga-
bon. They reveal that effective protection of all industries in each mem-
ber country was higher than the nominal protection. The most protected
activities in Cameroon, Congo and the CAR were the manufacturing of
chemical products, wood and wood products. In Cameroon the manufac-
turing of food was also highly protected. Another study on the Ivory
Coast [Olopoenia, 1975, p. 21] shows that nominal tariff rates escalate
with the degree of processing of cocoa beans, fruits, sugar, rubber,
hides and cotton implying also that effective protection in the respective
industries is higher than nominal rates on their final output.
y. Implications of Tariff Protection on Resource Allocation in ACP Coun-
tries
The empirical evidence confirms that tariff structures at least in African
ACP countries tend to end up in higher effective rates of protection
than is indicated by the nominal rates (2). In other words the excess
costs of the domestic production in ACP countries resulting from the
protection are higher than those indicated by the nominal tariff rates or
by the excess of domestic over world market prices. Apart from this
there are other well-known following adverse effects of extensive and
selective use of tariffs as a tool to foster industrialisation:
(1) Food, tobacco, beverages, textiles (including clothing and footwear),
wood and wood processing, chemicals and metal manufacturing. These
industries comprise goods which are subjected to a single tax accru-
ing to the country of destination within CACEU (taxe unique). Under
the "taxe unique" regime all essential inputs can be imported free of
customs charges.
(2) The estimates were made in the late sixties. However, as most ACP
countries did not offer tariff concessions in the Tokyo Round nego-
tiations, the results still hold.Table 29 - Nominal and Effective Rates of Protection (a) in Tanzania,
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for individual products. -
Source: Kessel [1968, p. 7, Tab. l]j Oyejide [1975, pp. 52 f.,
Tab. 5.1]; Reimer [1971, pp. 36 f., Tab. 1]; own calculations.75
- Protection of the manufacturing sector implies a discrimination of all
other activities in ACP countries which are not protected. Of special
importance is that the internal terms of trade turn against the un-
protected agricultural sector. This impedes investment and therefore
growth of output of that sector. In return the protected sector ab-
sorbs scarce resources which otherwise would have been allocated to
sectors with higher factor productivities.
- Within the manufacturing sector intermediate industries are impeded so
that industrial production remains biased towards "early" industries
like food, tobacco, beverages and textiles.
- As in the case of agricultural production tariff protection discrimi-
nates also against export industries. While their prices are broadly
determined by the world market, inward-looking industries can shift
excess costs to the consumer and attract' resources away from export
industries. Furthermore, high rates of effective tariff protection lead
to balance-of-payments pressures, foster currency overvaluation and
import licencing and thereby hinder non-traditional exports.
- Existing tariff structures also tend to increase physical capital in-
tensity of domestic production because they make the use of imported
capital goods more profitable than it would be in a situation under
freer trade. Thus, employment of the relative abundant factor, labour,
on which comparative advantages of these countries are based is dis-
couraged.
To sum up, there is much evidence from country studies that it is a
distorted tariff structure rather than the nominal tariff level which de-
termines tariff protection as an important element of the import substi-
tution policy pursued in many ACP countries. In this respect tariff holi-
days launched through the investment legislation seem to have had a
decisive influence on high rates of effective protection in finished goods
and on the poor record of non-traditional export-oriented industries.
b. Quantitative Restrictions
a. Non-Tariff Measures as a Substitute for Tariffs
Parallel to the reduction of tariff barriers (TBs) in international trade
because of both GATT negotiated MFN cuts and the introduction of uni-
lateral tariff concessions, non-tariff barriers (NTBs) have gained impor-
tance. As the current discussion on trade-impeding measures outside the
GATT framework highlights, NTBs in the form of voluntary export self-
restraints have proved most controversial.
The number of NTBs ranging from quantitative restrictions to import
deposit requirements, health and technical standard regulations and gov-
ernment procurements in favour of domestic suppliers - to mention only a
few - makes it ambitious if not impossible to quantify NTBs and to make
them comparable to TBs. However, exactly this problem confronting
trade policy analysts just illustrates the advantage of NTBs for protec-
tionist purposes vis-a-vis TBs. For example, they are not transparent
and therefore difficult to dismantle in international trade policy nego-
tiations; they are selective according to sectoral application and can be
handled very flexibly; and they are effective in restricting the import
volume since unlike tariffs they do not allow domestic purchasers to sa-76
tisfy additional import demand by paying the world market prices plus
the tariffs. Any rise in the case of quantitative restrictions in domestic
demand will therefore raise the domestic price and simultaneously the
costs of protection giving rise to misallocation of domestic resources.
B. The Spread of Quantitative Restrictions in ACP Countries
Attention to NTBs has mostly been devoted in only one direction of
world trade, that is exports of developing countries to developed coun-
tries. However, developing countries in general (1) and ACP countries
in particular apply NTBs as well. With regard to the latter group a dis-
tinction should be made between those NTBs which the countries inherit-
ed from their former metropolitan countries in terms of technical stan-
dards (2) and those which they introduced after independence. The for-
mer are left out of discussion here, and so is a sub-group of the latter
category comprising short-term NTBs for balance of payments purposes
(import deposit requirements, for instance). The remaining NTBs include
one of the most important of them, viz. quantitative restrictions which
are applied as a permanent complement to tariffs. However, even if the
analysis is confined to quantitative restrictions, their pattern remains
diffuse and widely spread. ACP countries apply the full scale of quanti-
tatative controls encompassing automatic or facultative licencing for im-
port surveillance, facultative and obligatory quotas and import prohibi-
tions. This, is evident even from a cursory glance on the import regime
schedules of 17 ACP countries at the end of the seventies (3). The
schedules are highly selective in order to give an effective shelter to
import-competing industries.
A specific form of quantitative restrictions linking import-competing in-
dustries with the non-tariff protection in a direct way has been imple-
mented in Cameroon. Here so called "produits jumeles" are allowed to be
imported only if domestic industries issue a certificate saying that they
cannot deliver that product in volume and quality within a given due
time. It appears that this regulation is the most far-reaching way of
giving non-tariff shelter to domestic industries.
The adverse impact of quantitative restrictions on internal resource allo-
cation in the Ivory Coast has been recently pointed out by the World
Bank at the time of granting adjustment loans [ Marches Tropicaux et
Mediterraneens, 1984]. Not only did the World Bank recommend - as dis-
cussed above - a tariff reform through which the escalation of tariffs
should be abolished (4) but also that the quantitative restrictions should
(1) For a recent empirical comparison see Langhammer [1983],
(2) Francophone countries use French industrial norms and hence only
allow imports to enter if they are consistent with these norms,
whereas anglophone countries apply British norms.
(3) These countries are Cameroon, the Ivory Coast, Kenya, Madagascar,
Mali, Tanzania, Nigeria, Zambia, Zaire, Sierra Leone, Jamaica,
Ghana, Malawi, Sudan, Rwanda, Ethiopia and Somalia.
(4) Tariffs on imports of intermediates which can often be imported du-
ty-free under the Ivorian investment code as well as in many other
ACP countries' investment codes should be reimposed in order to
lower effective protection rates of finished goods production and to
stimulate the emergence of local intermediate industries.77
be replaced by temporary surcharges on imports to be progressively
eliminated within five years. According to "Marches Tropicaux" this pro-
cedure would affect mainly the Ivorian footwear production, textile and
clothing industry. The effectiveness of quantitative restrictions can be
assessed by the reported reactions of affected Ivorian groups. According
to them the quantitative restrictions appear to be the most effective
shelter against imports in the Ivory Coast. Then come the tariff struc-
ture with its escalation effect and the tariff level in descending order of
importance.
y. The Incidence of Non-Tariff Distortions in ACP Countries
Transforming the non-tariff measures into an equivalent of tariffs in
order to make NTBs comparable and negotiable is a delicate task. It re-
quires making assumptions on world market prices and on the degree of
substitutability between imports and domestic goods. However, if we as-
sume that the extent of protection can roughly be assessed by the dif-
ference between local and world market prices comparisons should be
feasible as far as data on both the prices are available. Differences be-
tween the two prices can then be separated into a tariff component and a
residual. The latter broadly reflects non-tariff restrictions if the goods
are fairly homogenous and tariffs are effective. National indirect taxes
may also explain price differences but as tariffs are the major source of
budget revenues in low-income countries and as excise taxes are mostly
imposed upon luxury goods which are not discussed here, taxes are not
considered in the following analysis. But transportation costs are con-
sidered by referring to cif/fob ratios of imports as analysed in Section
III.3.a.
The basic source of domestic and world market price comparisons for a
few ACP countries presented in the following is the UN International
Comparison Project (ICP) which has assessed purchasing power parities
for 33 countries plus the USA and for the wide range of goods and ser-
vices in order to adjust for income differentials between countries.
Among the sample countries there were three African ACP countries
(Zambia, Malawi, and Kenya) and one Caribbean member country, viz.
Jamaica. The latter is not included here because of the inavailability of
tariff data for the year 1975 which is relevant in this case. Using a pro-
xy for the world market prices and confining the comparison to textiles,
clothing and footwear which are the most heavily protected industries in
ACP countries, the calculations in general yield higher equivalents for
non-tariff measures than the nominal tariff rates (Table 30).
These equivalents are much higher for Zambia than for Malawi and Ke-
nya. However, this pattern is not uniform. On the contrary, the rates
of tariff equivalents fluctuated widely between sub-categories of textiles
as well as between the three countries. A negative rate for household
textiles in Malawi indicates that there was "water in the tariff" (positive
tariff redundancy).
Since the sharp fluctuations can indicate both, the selectiveness of non-
tariff measures applied differently to product categories and the doubt-
fulness of the domestic market price assessments in the ICP project, the
adequateness of this method for policy conclusions is questionable. How-
ever, what is relevant is that tariffs cannot solely explain differencesTable 30 - Estimates of Tariff Equivalents of Non-Tariff Distortions in Zambia, Malawi and Kenya, 1975
(per cent)
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(a) Average of the five lowest domestic price levels (United States equal to 100) obtained from binary purchasing
power parity calculations in the UN International Comparison Project (ICP). PPP is defined as the number of units of
a country's currency that are required to buy what can be bought in the United States with one US $. The three ACP
countries' PPPs have been converted into a domestic market price index (United States equal to 100) by dividing them
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is the tariff equivalent for commodity group j, P,. and P . are world market prices proxies and domestic
market prices, T. is the IMF cif/fob ratio for ACP country imports as a proxy for costs of transportation and N. is
the nominal tariff rate.
Source: Kravis et al. [1982, Multilateral Tab. 6-3; Appendix Tab. 6.3, pp. 176-179; 208-215]; National
Customs Schedules, derived from Deutsches Handels-Archiv, Vol. 128, 1974, No. 5; Vol. 129, 1975,
No. 16; Vol. 131, 1977, No. 24.79
between domestic and world market prices. This suggests that NTBs are
probably more important for price distortions of goods than TBs. Whe-
ther this is due to quantitative restrictions or for example due to the
existence of state trading companies operating especially in Zambia can-
not be said definitely. Nevertheless, NTBs are apparently strong com-
ponents of policies biased in favour of import substitution in ACP coun-
tries, and they therefore heavily discriminate against non-traditional
exports of these countries.
c. Inflation
a. Effects of Inflation in Low-Income Countries
Inflation defined broadly as an upward trend in prices distorts the rela-
tion between current and future consumption of goods. It is often used
to finance expansionary development strategies in Third World countries.
This is especially true for the low-income countries where domestic sav-
ings are insufficient to finance capital formation. While the Keynesian
approach to inflationary development finance stresses the redistribution
of income within the private sector (from wage earners to entrepre-
neurs), the quantity theory approach emphasizes the fact that inflation
is like a government tax on the holders of cash balances [Johnson, 1967,
p. 124]. Thus both the theories suggest a shift in income distribution,
in the first case to the detriment of wage earners and in the second case
to the detriment of cash holders. Observed patterns of reactions by
those who are negatively affected are of two kinds: the emergence of
parallel currencies (a kind of anti-Gresham's law in the sense that stable
money displaces unstable money) and the substitution of financial assets
by unproductive real assets (durable consumer goods, cattle, land, gold)
[UN, a, p. 7], Supply of lending capital is thus frustrated, whereas the
dependence on foreign savings (aid, private capital) increases. Such
adverse effects of inflation are exacerbated if nominal interest rates are
not allowed to adjust. As already shown in Section V.l.b a number of
ACP countries pursue such a policy of putting low ceilings on nominal
interest rates for loans and deposits at banks and other institutions in
the organized financial market (financial repression). Real interest rates
are thus very low or even negative in several ACP countries.
As a result, both inflation and financial repression provide survival
rents for the non-monetized sector. This means that structural changes
in the economy in the sense that this sector shrinks over time are im-
peded. Given the poor income on financial assets in some ACP countries
- as discussed above - it is therefore not surprising that especially in
African and Pacific ACP countries non-monetary activities are of consi-
derable importance (1). As inflation encourages people to adhere to
(1) The share of non-monetary output in GDP at the beginning of the
seventies was estimated to be well above 20 per cent in some African
countries (e.g. 45 per cent in Ethiopia, 39 per cent in Malawi, 42
per cent in Niger, 28 per cent in Tanzania, 38 per cent in Burkina
Faso). In the Asian countries the highest share estimated was 21 per
cent; in the Latin American countries 13 per cent. These estimates80
subsistence production the vicious circle of low domestic capital forma-
tion, low productivity, low growth and hence low savings continues to
exist.
Apart from these adverse effects there are additional reasons why infla-
tion retards economic growth:
- While inflation raises the nominal rate of return on capital, it reduces
the real rate of interest (especially in the context of a low interest
rate policy). This amounts to a waste of capital because it makes pro-
jects profitable which in a situation of price stability would be qual-
ified as unproductive. Credit rationing is then a further source of
efficiency losses.
- During inflation governments try to control prices of specific goods
and services (e.g. prices of basic food and public utilities) to protect
parts of the community (especially the urban population) from losses in
real income. However, if food prices are not allowed to rise in an in-
flationary situation production and investment in the agricultural sector
and thus rural development is impeded. Further, administered prices
of public utilities imply a subsidy to consumers and therefore a loss of
government resources which could be used for investment.
- Finally, inflation increases the need for adjustments in exchange rates
(see Section V.3).
3. Empirical Evidence of Inflation in ACP Countries
Table 31 provides some information on the development of consumer pri-
ces in the ACP countries during the period 1965 - 1980. In the African
member states the average rate of inflation rose from 4.2 per cent in
1965-1970 to 6.7 per cent in 1971-1973 and then sharply to 17.4 per cent
in 1974-1979. This includes high'rates of inflation in Ghana, Uganda and
Zaire where the average inflation rate leaped up during the same period
to 58.0, 51.8, and 60.6 per cent, respectively. However, even if these
countries are not taken into account, the average rate of inflation in the
period 1974-1979 more than doubled to 13.7 per cent compared to the
average rate of 6.1 per cent in the early seventies. Since the early
eighties inflation in the African ACP countries as a whole has not in-
creased although it continued to persist during 1980-1982 at a high
level of 17.4 per cent.
However, differences in inflation rates of the African ACP members have
increased considerably. This is indicated by the coefficient of variation
which rose from 0.21 (1974-1979) to 0.47 (1980-81) (1). Some of this
divergence may reflect the fact that in nineteen out of forty-five sample
countries stabilization programs supported by the IMF were carried out
in 1980 and 1981 [Zulu, Nsouli, 1984].
were provided by Blades [1975, p. 80], In Papua New Guinea, Fiji,
Tonga and (Western) Samoa this share was estimated at 29 per cent,
15 per cent, 37 per cent and 39 per cent, respectively at the be-
ginning of the seventies. For reference, see Chandavarkar [1977,
p. 680].
(1) Excluding Ghana, Uganda and Zaire. Coefficients of variation for all
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Source: IMF [c]; World Bank [e]; own calculations.82
Also the Caribbean ACP countries suffered from high rates of inflation
during the seventies which increased from an average of 7.8 per cent in
1970-73 to 14.0 per cent in 1974-79. As in the African ACP countries,
the sharp increase in inflation rates however did not continue in the
early eighties. Data on inflation in the Pacific ACP countries are avail-
able only for three countries, namely Fiji, Papua New Guinea and Samoa.
In none of these countries such high rates of inflations are observed as
in the other two groups of countries.
y. Inflation Rate Differentials between Franc Zone and Non-Franc Zone
Members
Differences in average inflation rates among ACP countries may be due
to the fact that some of them are members of the French monetary union
and therefore face larger constraints on monetary growth than others.
This hypothesis was subjected to statistical tests comparing average in-
flation rates of the francophone member countries of the Union Monetaire
Ouest Africaine (UMOA) (1) and of the Banque Centrale des Etats d'Af-
rique Centrale (BEAC) (2) with those of the non-members who are de-
vided in two groups, viz. A (3) and B. B includes in addition to those
in A the three high-inflation countries Ghana, Uganda and Zaire. The
tests show that in 1965-70 the inflation in the francophone countries was
significantly lower (about 10 per cent) than in group B but in the fol-
lowing period there was no significant difference. However, during 1974-
1979 when inflation sharply increased in general, the average rate of
inflation in the member states of the monetary unions (12.3 per cent)
was significantly lower than in group B (23.1 per cent) and group A
(15.3 per cent). This result suggests that in face of accelerating infla-
tion the close coordination of monetary policies in the Franc Zone coun-
tries with France and among each other has contributed to their greater
price stability. In the following period (1980-1982) the difference in in-
flation rates of francophone countries and group B was statistically sig-
nificant but not that between those of francophone countries and group
A. Both of these results can be attributed to the fact that inflation rates
showed large variations between the countries of group A in this period
(4).
(1) Members of the UMOA today are Benin, Ivory Coast, Niger, Senegal,
Togo and Burkina Faso. Up to 1972, Mauretania was also member and
is therefore included in the first two subperiods.
(2) This group consists of Cameroon, the CAR, Congo and Gabon. Up to
1973, Madagascar was also member of the Franc Zone and is there-
fore included in the monetary union group during the first two sub-
periods.
(3) Group A consists of Ethiopia, Gambia, Jamaica, Kenya, Malawi, Nige-
ria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Trinidad and Tobago,
Zaire, and Zambia.
(4) If the three countries with exceptionally high inflation are included
for this comparison, the expected pattern of significantly lower in-
flation rates in the Franc Zone countries emerges again.83
6. Inflation in ACP Countries in International Comparison
Inflation is, however, not confined to the ACP countries and a compari-
son with inflation rates in other areas is in order, especially for the
seventies (1). In the industrialized countries the average inflation rate
declined from 11.2 per cent in 1971-1973 to 9.3 per cent in 1974-1979.
Unless exchange rates in the countries were allowed to depreciate in
accordance with the differences between their inflation rates and those of
the industrialised countries, competitiveness of the ACP manufactured
exports suffered losses on their major markets (see also Section V.3). It
is interesting to note that for example in the Asian developing countries
(excluding the oil-exporting countries) the average rate of inflation
(16.3 per cent) in 1971-1973 rose by only 0.2 percentage points in 1974-
1979. Compared with the acceleration of inflation in the African and Ca-
ribbean ACP countries during the late seventies, this negligible increase
suggests that inflation in ACP countries cannot be regarded as a result
of only external shocks like that of oil prices after 1973.
e. Price Change Variability arid Administered Prices in ACP Countries
While a steady rate of inflation makes it easier for people to adjust to
inflationary processes, an erratical inflation does the contrary and in-
creases the uncertainty. Uncertainty impedes the development of local
capital markets even if the current inflation rate is low simply because of
the loss of confidence in the steadyness of monetary policies. It is note-
worthy that especially the relatively unexperienced local population ra-
ther than the expatriates who can deposit their savings overseas have to
cope with uncertainties. Table 32 shows that even in member countries of
the UMOA, where inflation rates did not increase as dramatically as in
other ACP countries, fluctuations in the annual inflation rates were con-
siderable during the seventies. This holds in particular for Senegal and
Togo where the local population was confronted with an increase in con-
sumer prices between 0.5 and 30.6 per cent. In food, which is the most
important expenditure item of African households, the fluctuations in
price increases were even much more pronounced. Given the high weight
of food in the goods basket of African households (Ivory Coast: 51.1 per
cent; Senegal: 56 per cent; Togo: 47.9 per cent [BCEAO, 1983]), chan-
ges in the indices of consumer prices seem to be determined to a great
extent by changes in food prices.
Compared with the African households, European households in these
ACP countries were less affected by inflation as indicated by the average
rate of increase in consumer prices in the period 1973-1981. Further, in
Senegal and Togo, for instance, the fluctuations in increase of consumer
prices for European households were substantially lower; this may be
partly due to the fact that increases in food prices were much more uni-
form for the Europeans than for African households.
Fluctuations in price increases may be especially noticed in those prod-
ucts whose prices are controlled or determined by governments. During
times of inflation prices of these goods tend to lag behind the prices of
(1) Average inflation rates for these areas were calculated from the IMF
consumer price indices for different regions [IMF, c].Table 32 - Cost of Living in Selected ACP Countries, African and Euro-




































































































































































































Source: BCEAO [current issues]; own calculations.85
goods in general. This calls for occasional adjustments with correspond-
ing price pushes. To test this hypothesis price movements for two bun-
dles of goods and services (basic food as well as transport, energy and
public utilities) whose prices were assumed to be heavily influenced by
government interventions were examined in the case of Cameroon (1).
During 1973-1981 fluctuations in the price increase of basic food were
substantially higher than fluctuations in the increase of all consumer
goods. The average rate of price increase in basic food, however, was
in line with that in the total of consumer goods. Fluctuations in the
price increase of the second bundle of goods were also considerably
higher than those of the total of consumer goods. Furthermore the aver-
age rate of price increase in this bundle was substantially lower than
that of total consumer goods (7.3 per cent and 11.7 per cent, respec-
tively) .
To conclude, though inflation in ACP countries in general has not been
as excessive as for instance in Latin America, its adverse effects in low-
income countries with high shares of subsistence economies should not be
underrated. It hampers the monetization of the economies, the formation
of local savings and the growth of capital markets in these countries. In
addition, fluctuations in inflation rates caused partly by discretionary
adjustments of administered prices seem to discourage mainly local house-
holds to keep their savings in financial assets. As the development of
non-traditional export activities crucially depends on a sizeable domestic
capital supply and its efficient allocation to local private borrowers both
inflation and the variability of its rates tend to retard changes in econo-
mic structures of ACP countries.
3. Exchange Rate Policies
a. Purchasing Power Parity Exchange Rates of ACP Countries
Trade preferences are expected to stimulate exports of the preference-
receiving countries because they give them a price advantage vis-a-vis
the non-beneficiaries. However, in those cases where the difference be-
tween the prices of the preference-receiving countries and those on the
world market is higher than the preference margin, the preference must
fail to stimulate exports of the beneficiaries. Some ACP agricultural ex-
ports presented in Section IV.2 bear witness to the negative preference
redundancy.
As already shown one can find a strong tendency for inefficient high-
cost production in ACP countries due to a variety of policy-induced dis-
tortions in factor and goods markets. As a consequence official exchange
rates become overvalued. To compensate this competitive disadvantage on
foreign markets devaluations of currencies would be necessary. In an
inflationary context where domestic inflation is higher in its trend than
(1) To economize on space the related table was dropped. It can be
made available on request. Basic food includes bread, maize flour,
rice and sugar; the second bundle comprises prices for transporta-
tion, petrol, electricity and water.86
inflation in major trade partners this means that a country wishing to
improve its competitive position on world markets would have to depreci-
ate its currency by more than the inflation rate differential, that is to
depreciate in real terms.
However, in many ACP countries exchange rates during the seventies
had a tendendy to appreciate in real terms, i.e. depreciations were less
than the differentials between the inflation rates. According to World
Bank estimates for Sub-Saharan Africa real exchange rates appreciated
on the average by 44 per cent during 1973-1981 [World Bank, d, p.
58]. One has to bear in mind that if exchange rates at the beginning of
the period were already overvalued, this rate of appreciation would indi-
cate only the additional loss in competitiveness during the seventies. It
also suggests that on the average at least the African ACP members
could not have taken much advantage of the preferences conceded by the
EC (1).
The development of nominal and real (purchasing power parity) exchange
rates of some selected ACP countries (Table 33) shows that appreciation
in real terms was quite substantial between 1970 and 1980 in Cameroon
(34 per cent), Ghana (78 per cent), Ivory Coast (43 per cent), Nigeria
(55 per cent), Senegal (29 per cent), Tanzania (20 per cent) and Zaire
(60 per cent). This coincides with the findings for the 1963-77/78 period
when in the majority of African countries exchange rates appreciated in
real terms (2). However, in some of these countries this trend seems to
(1) A hypothetical example may illustrate the impact of exchange rate
changes on the effectiveness of preferences. Assume that the world
market price of a specific commodity is US $ 10. If the EC tariff rate
on this product is 10 per cent its price on the EC market then is US
$ 11. Cost of production of that commodity is shilling (sh.) 105 in
ACP country A; the exchange rate is l$=10 sh. Clearly country A is
not competitive on international markets. The price of its product on
the EC market would be US $ 11.55 including the tariff of 10 per
cent. If country A now is granted duty-free entry on the EC market
it would be a competitive supplier at the prevailing exchange rate
(the price at which it can offer its product would be US $ 10.5).
Suppose now that there is inflation in country A which has raised its
costs of production to sh. 115.5 (rate of inflation 10 per cent) while
inflation outside is zero. If the nominal exchange rate does not
change, i.e. the real exchange rate appreciates by 9.1 per cent, the
trade preference would be ineffective because the price of the com-
modity it offers would be US $ 11.55 as before. On the contrary if
country A devalues the nominal exchange rate by the differential
inflation rate (10 per cent) the real exchange rate would remain con-
stant. In this case it could take full advantage of the trade prefer-
ence. At the new nominal exchange rate of 1$/11 sh. the foreign
currency price of its commodity would be again US $ 10.5.
(2) African Centre of Monetary Studies, Balance of Payments Problems of
African Countries and Their Effects on Development Objectives,
Dakar, August 1979; cited in World Bank [a, p. 25]. Since 1980
many African countries have witnessed a greater willingness to de-
preciate their nominal exchange rates in real terms, a turnaround
compared with the 1970s [World Bank, f, p. 35].87
Table 33 - Indices of Nominal and Real Exchange Rates (a) of Selected

















































100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
99.79 101.41 100.00 97.85 99.79 107.27 98.62 98.87
90.82 90.64 128.61 119.62 90.82 102.12 96.14 95.76
80.19 77.90 113.66 97.04 80.19 89.17 109.10 98.87
86.60 90.56 112.70 91.94 86.60 96.49 109.10 86.85
77.17 70.19 112.70 79.97 77.17 85.65 109.10 84.02
86.05 77.68 112.70 56.05 86.05 92.77 109.10 83.59
88.46 75.62 112.70 28.23 88.46 80.92 109.10 82.46
81.25 66.54 113.16 17.34 81.25 69.15 172.22 104.39
76.60 64.41 269.53 29.17 76.60 59.31 212.04 111.03
76.09 65.71 269.53 22.04 76.09 56.60 213.78 100.71
97.85 85.07 269.53 11.02 97.85 72.07 213.78 99.43









100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
100.00 102.69 99.71 99.43 99.69 91.18 99.79 101.69
100.00 102.30 96.20 98.30 92.10 86.69 90.82 91.57
98.02 100.00 98.32 81.02 92.10 88.02 80.19 78.82
100.00 99.46 100.95 105.95 88.03 83.53 86.60 82.14
102.80 99.13 103.66 111.62 86.17 69.05 77.17 62.20
117.14 113.56 109.56 127.76 87.72 61.90 86.05 75.10
115.87 109.38 108.35 137.96 90.24 60.57 88.46 75.28
108.21 94.06 101.26 125.50 88.91 51.75 81.25 72.87
104.65 93.37 98.03 121.25 84.38 48.59 76.60 68.56
103.88 93.91 97.46 117.00 76.51 44.76 76.09 70.76
126.66 114.34 107.44 • 130.03 85.93 45.92 97.85 96.58







100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
100.00 101.46 100.00 99.09 100.00 100.82
100.00 99.35 100.00 89.86 100.00 100.82
98.30 95.58 100.00 83.51 90.84 93.99
99.89 92.59 100.00 73.55 90.09 99.45
103.79 86.77 100.00 63.59 90.09 104.10
117.31 101.31 161.40 61.96 99.86 108.47
115.84 99.04 171.40 42.21 110.46 111.48
107.65 88.39 167.20 29.53 113.75 105.46
115.50 92.00 345.80 31.70 110.92 103.28
114.73 80.11 560.00 40.22 110.39 105.19
116.05 71.33 876.80 51.81 122.09 113.12












































































formula was used for computations:
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Source: IMF [a; b].
have reversed since 1981. In Cameroon, the Ivory Coast and Senegal
nominal depreciations in 1981 and 1982 were sufficient to depreciate the
real exchange rates considerably. Further Table 33 shows that apprecia-
tion of the real exchange rate is not common to all African ACP coun-
tries. This is especially true for Malawi and Zambia as well as for
Kenya. During the seventies depreciations in these countries secured
their competitiveness vis-a-vis major trading partners. Major devaluations
in 1978 and 1979 also in Jamaica brought its domestic inflation in line
with price changes on its most important export markets.
Table 33 contains further the development of the real exchange rate of
three potential competitors of ACP countries in non-traditional exports on
the EC market, that is Colombia, Uruguay and Sri Lanka. These three
countries belong to the so-called second generation of developing coun-
tries exporting manufactures and hence appear to be more appropriate
reference countries than the "giants" of the first generation, e.g. South
Korea or Taiwan.
While in Colombia and Uruguay also the real exchange rate appreciated
by 22 per cent in each case between 1970 and 1982, Sri Lanka had a89
strong currency depreciation of over 200 per cent during the same peri-
od. The Latin American countries have thus lost competitiveness on their
major export markets while Sri Lanka seems to have improved its inter-
national competitiveness substantially.
b. Effects of Exchange Rate Distortions on Sectoral Output
Apart from this statistical evidence there are further indicators of ex-
change rate overvaluation. Since an overvalued exchange rate implies an
excess demand for foreign exchange, governments especially in Africa
have increasingly resorted to_ import restrictions to cope with the limited
supply of foreign exchange [World Bank, a, p. 55]. On the export side
currency overvaluation reduces competitiveness of the ACP countries on
foreign market and is therefore a serious barrier to their exports in
general and export diversification towards manufactures in particular. In
combination with other policy measures it is an important factor in ex-
plaining the poor export performance of the ACP countries. These mea-
sures refer to the treatment of the agricultural sector as well as to in-
dustrialization policies. Of course, not all of the ACP countries pursue
the same policies but one can find for a number of them the following
two common characteristics (1):
First, exchange rate overvaluation means low proceeds in domestic cur-
rency for producers of traditional agricultural exports whose prices are
determined on the world market and are fixed in convertible currencies.
Further, export crops are heavily taxed expecially in Africa [World
Bank, a, p. 55]. Here one has also to take into account the implicit ta-
xation by state trading agencies which in almost every ACP country ope-
rate in the marketing of export crops. They are characterized by serious
inefficiencies. So in several African countries the price actually paid to
farmers did not even cover their costs of production and for major agri-
cultural exports of seven African countries (Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria,
Senegal, Sudan, Tanzania, Zambia) producers frequently received less
than 50 per cent of the real value of their crops [World Bank, a,
p. 26], Discrimination of the agricultural sector via heavy taxation and
an overvalued exchange rate provided thus strong disincentives to far-
mers to engage in the production of agricultural exports.
Second, what might be of greater importance for the long-term develop-
ment prospects of ACP countries is that the exchange rate overvaluation
should not be allowed to hamper the process towards export orientation
in manufactured goods. By maintaining overvalued exchange rates, ACP
countries cut themselves off from the fastest growing part of interna-
tional trade and discourage potential foreign investors who have to pay
(1) It holds without saying that an autonomous exchange rate policy is
not feasible for those African countries which are members of the
Franc-Zone. This lack of an important policy instrument imposes
constraints on individual countries with regard to monetary expan-
sionary policies and to coordination requirements with partner coun-
tries pooling their exchange reserves too. These constraints accen-
tuated by the French control of monetary growth seem to have,
however, a sizable pay-off concerning convertibility guarantee, re-
source inflow and monetary stability.90
more for local factors of production than under equilibrium exchange
rates. The bias against exports is reinforced if industrialization is tried
to be achieved mainly by import substitution. Here an overvalued ex-
change rate enables relatively cheap imports of capital goods and raw
materials. At the same time tariff rates on these "essential" inputs are
low (or zero) while local industry output in finished goods is protected
by high nominal tariffs or other import restrictions against foreign sub-
stitutes. Thus a high effective rate of protection makes it much more
profitable to invest in industries producing for local markets rather than
for exports. An exchange rate depreciation in this context could provide
the necessary price incentive to switch resources in the production of
manufactured exports. At the same time it would make import restrictions
superfluous and contribute to a more efficient allocation of imports allow-
ing for a better use of the existing factor endowment.
c. Cases Against Exchange Rate Adjustments and Their Validity
Since depreciation is an effective measure to promote exports the ques-
tion arises why ACP countries in many cases did not make use of this
policy instrument. Though there is no coherent answer given by the
governments of ACP countries, two often cited arguments against the
usefulness of a depreciation should be mentioned (1).
- First, foreign exchange earnings of many ACP countries depend
heavily on the export of agricultural products and/or industrial raw
materials. Price elasticity of export demand in these products is low. A
depreciation is expected to reduce total export earnings because the
loss of earnings from traditional exports could not be compensated by
the possible increase in export earnings from non-traditional
manufactured products. The elasticity of supply of exports is also
expected to be low. Such an argument, however, is based on given
economic structures and underestimates if not neglects structural
changes. In reality this need not be the case. A depreciation combined
with an export tax on traditional commodities would leave their price in
foreign exchange constant, thereby also foreign exchange earnings. At
the same time depreciation would provide the incentive necessary to
stimulate both risk capital inflow in non-traditional sectors and exports
of manufactured goods.
- Second, a depreciation is feared to end up in a vicious circle of accel-
erated inflation and further depreciation. Overvalued exchange rates
are hence taken as a tool to fight inflation. In evaluating this proposi-
tion one has at first to bear in mind that it is often an inflationary
domestic policy that causes balance-of-payments problems and thus a
pressure for devaluation. In the course of such a policy import demand
will rise and worsen the trade balance. At the same time the price of
non-traded goods will rise in relation to the price of traded goods, the
latter being broadly determined by the world market. This will induce
resources to move in the production of non-tradeables while demand
switches to traded goods; the trade balance will deteriorate further.
(1) See for a recent contribution on a pessimistic view of an "IMF sup-
ply-side" approach to exchange rate determination for an ACP coun-
try with "rigid" and "sticky" goods and factor markets Hussain,
Thirlwall [1984].91
Production of tradeables also becomes less profitable because domestic
costs of production have risen whereas their prices are determined by
the world market. Hence output in this sector will stagnate or decline.
Flight of capital might also be encouraged because of higher real inter-
est rates abroad and because of the extra profit to capital owners if
expected depreciation does actually take place.
A depreciation in this context must be seen as a measure to compen-
sate the adverse effects of such a policy on the country's external
position. In combination with a policy-induced reduction in domestic
absorption it implies a real burden to the economy. However, this bur-
den could be reduced if depreciation would not be postponed for a
long time. The higher the external deficit is, the greater the rate of
depreciation has to be to restore external equilibrium and the greater
the costs of adjustment would be.
To sum up, arguments against the policy of exchange rate changes in a
flexible, predictable and coherent manner are based on the given and
presumably unchangeable predominance of primary commodities in the
export supply of ACP countries. In addition to this comes the pessimism
on price elasticities of demand and supply. However, such attitudes are
self-defeating since they preserve a short-sighted pessimistic view to-
wards structural changes. It is also a short-sighted though politically
understandable view to refuse exchange rate adjustments because of
their short-term pecuniary losses. Financing export diversification poli-
cies through depreciation will most likely result in losses of export earn-
ings for traditional goods. For many developing countries such a loss
seems too high a price. Instead they urge for preferences of importing
countries because a unilateral cut of tariffs is expected to shift the bur-
den of financing to the importing countries, in our case to the EC coun-
tries, and to non-beneficiaries. However, as the poor results of ACP
preferences show, this strategy seems to be inferior to the policy of
directly compensating for international factor price distortions through
currency depreciations or - even better - through removing the factor
price distortions themselves.
4. Disincentives to the Formation of Indigenous Entrepreneurship
a. Size and Pay of Government
Human capital embodied in managerial, commercial and technical know-how
is scarce in developing countries in general and in low-income developing
countries in particular. Thus ACP countries also suffer from the short-
age of this production factor which is indispensable for economic pro-
gress both in quantitative and qualitative terms.
Import of this factor is one way to overcome its shortage. ACP countries
have done so by attracting expatriates of various kinds of skills under
market conditions in extractive industries. However, the spillover of
know-how from foreigners to local people has mostly not taken place be-
cause ,of the capital-intensive nature of extractive activities, except in
some technical fields. Foreign skills were also imported under technical
aid, where transfer of know-how was supposedly greater. However, none92
of these was able to promote a strong growth of indigenous entrepre-
neurship, especially in export-oriented industries.
The other method to encourage the growth of local entrepreneurs is to
introduce a set of incentives for risk-bearing and profit-oriented activi-
ties. But they are rather scarce in ACP countries. On the contrary ma-
ny disincentives can be found there. Some of them are endogenous. For
example the spread of the Islam in many African ACP countries seems to
have impeded rather than supported risk-bearing activities. It is more a
trading than a production oriented religion with strong reservations
against the explicit remuneration for savings through interest payments.
Furthermore, individual welfare is not defined as the accumulation of
goods during his lifetime but'by his conformity with the Islamic laws.
Other disincentives are determined by natural environmental constraints.
The climatic "trap" in tropical areas reduces physical efficiency. How-
ever, as the economic progress in tropical areas outside the ACP coun-
tries shows, these handicaps need not necessarily hamper production.
A third group of disincentives to be elaborated here is influenced by the
role of governments. By setting the constitutional framework for econo-
mic activities (public goods aspect), by fixing limits to movements of
goods and factor prices as discussed above and by participating actively
in markets as suppliers or purchasers, they can crowd out individuals
from the market towards the governmental activities which may in many
cases lead to waste of resources.
The larger the size of a government in an economy is, the greater will
be the impact of its activities on the economy as a whole. In the case of
ACP countries this impact is indeed sizable in terms of government share
in employment in the non-agricultural sector (Table 34). On the average,
the public sector absorbed more than fifty per cent of total employees
outside agriculture in thirteen ACP countries at the end of the seven-
ties. This is higher than the average of non-ACP developing countries,
though statistically not significant due to enormous differences among
individual ACP countries varying between 87 per cent in Benin and 19
per cent in the Bahamas.
What, however, raises the ACP average above that of other developing
countries is the government pay. The latter is measured as the share of
wages paid by central government in total wages (on the average 22 per
cent in the sample ACP countries) and as the ratio between the average
government wage and the per capita income which is almost 6:1 compared
to 3:1 in other developing countries (1). In addition, central government
wages in some ACP countries are on the average higher than wages paid
in the other major source of permanent income, i.e. manufacturing. How-
ever, this holds for other developing countries too and is not as rele-
vant as the other shares, since people employed in both manufacturing
and the public sector receive permanent incomes and are hence privi-
leged minorities.
(1) Since most ACP countries are centrally governed with minor influen-
ces of state, district or local public agencies, the wages in central



















































































































(a) Differences between ACP and non-ACP country averages not significant. - (b) Differences between ACP



















Source: Heller, Tait [1983]; own calculations.The government size and pay in ACP countries provide a very strong
incentive towards a brain drain from private to public employment. Due
to job security as well as pecuniary benefits it pays to be employed in
the public sector. Since the educational requirements in public sector in
ACP countries are not much higher than in other sectors, human capital
is largely absorbed by it. Individuals behave rationally and acquire the
necessary skills in order to be employed in the public sector. However,
these skills are mostly related to administrative but not to entrepre-
neurial activities, and this has its costs in terms of entrepreneurship
forgone. Since the run for employment in the public sector is strong and
the non-acceptance rate high, people whose education process was fully
targeted at the public sector employment find themselves in an impasse
at the end of this process after the point of return has already passed.
The high school graduates or even university graduates employed in low-
graded private services (taxi driver) rather than in the private
industrial sector are a consequence of misallocation of scarce resources
which no ACP country can afford.
b. Administration of Justice and Government Control
Private lending for financing investments is based on legal contracts
covering current payments and future repayments including debt ser-
vice. Interest rates in real terms determine the allocation of credits to
different uses. Whether, however, savings are allocated to risk-bearing
activities at all, depends on the authority of the governments to ensure
that credit contracts with rights, obligations, and sanctions will be pro-
tected by independent courts regardless of any personal affiliation of
debtors and donors to the government. If this public good called admini-
stration of justice is not provided by the government, credit contracts
will not be made or will be confined to selected groups - sometimes based
on ethnical grounds - where a binding code of conduct and other loyal-
ties exist. In some ACP countries this public good has not been suffi-
ciently produced. This happened not only in the few obvious cases of
flagrant dictatorship, but also in other countries faced with numerous
riots and illegal activities in the black market. They signify a lack of
strong state authority with regard to supratribal loyalty and a discre-
pancy between the rules and their implementation. Likewise, governments
have often supported grudge of the majority against ethnical minorities
which are commercially successful because of ethnical reliable codes of
conduct (Indians in East Africa, Greek and Levantines in West Africa or
indigenous groups and tribes), and this attitude has enhanced barriers
to the consolidation of nation states.
Many efforts have been made to build up nation states in post-colonial
Africa. One of them was the imposition of state controls on private eco-
nomic activities and was based on the colonial heritage of paternalism and
public intervention in order to cope with economic problems. Yet, while
controls may be adequate in the legal framework, they can be self-de-
feating and costly if the state considers itself to be a better entrepre-
neur than the private investors. Apart from public enterprises state
participation in the private sector is widely spread in many ACP coun-
tries, not only in the so-called "etatist" states, but also in market-95
oriented countries (1). Effective state controls in the management of
private enterprises, however, detract administrative skills of senior offi-
cials from other occupations in running the public sector where such
skills have a higher marginal productivity. Another shortcoming of direct
state control is that it lowers the necessity of private equity holders to
finance their investments on private capital markets and that it shifts
the risk of investment failure to the public sector. The latter aspect is
crucial since the state - once it is committed in the enterprise - is not
likely to be neutral to gains and losses. Instead it will probably help
avoiding investment failures ("moral hazard" problem) and thus will pro-
vide security at zero costs for the private shareholders. That is why
many foreign investors in ACP countries welcome a minority state partici-
pation as an insurance against failures and foreign competition. The
emergence of entrepreneurship which includes risk assessment and mana-
gerial responses will thus be suppressed rather than be supported.
c. Discrimination of Entrepreneurship in the Informal Sector
The urban informal sector in ACP countries is the main source of indige-
nous local entrepreneurship. It is the basis for upgrading managerial
skills and for employment of non-family members also. Its two most note-
worthy characteristics are its inaccessibility for state controls by its na-
ture and its need for capital for improvement. These two elements form a
trade-off. Capital is usually only lent to those who can meet security
requirements, have legal and permanent accounting systems and maintain
at least minimum standards of buildings, health and safety. This is just
what the urban informal sector fails to meet. By its very nature its acti-
vities are nonlegal (2) (not necessarily illegal) and much of its attrac-
tiveness for small scale entrepreneurs is derived from the freedom of
operating outside wage legislations and other regulations. Bringing the
managerial skills developed in the informal sector to an upgraded level,
that is to formal activities for future export-orientation, requires a com-
promise on both sides.
(1) Two examples illustrate this point. In the Ivory Coast state and
para-statal agencies' participation in equity capital of the industrial
sector increased from 17 per cent in 1974 to 64 per cent in 1981
[MEF, 1976; 1983] at the cost of foreign investors as the share of
private Ivorian capital decreased from 10 per cent to 9 per cent.
In Gabon recently a new "Code of Participation" has been launched
claiming that any new enterprise under Gabonese law has to offer
10 per cent of equity capital free of charge to the state. If equity
is increased, 10 per cent of this increase also has to go to the
state. The state can have a representative in the board of direc-
tors. Furthermore, it can participate in important enterprises
against payment. See Law No. 8/83 (Decret No. O1759/PR) cited in
Bundesstelle fur Au Benhandelsinformation, Nachrichten fur AuBen-
handel, No. 119, 25 July 1984.
(2) See for two country studies elaborating the issue of entrepreneur-
ship in the informal sector ILO/UNDP [1972]; World Bank [g,
Annex 3, Ch. 1]; Joshi et al. [1976].96
Entrepreneurs have to obey laws if they do not want to be cut off from
private and public capital markets. ACP governments on the other hand
should reconsider regulations under the criteria that they should not
frustrate infant entrepreneurial activities and that they are not super-
fluous for the mass of African households supplied by the informal sec-
tor. That means that credit allocation should not systematically discrimi-
nate against informal activities. If private capital should assess the risk
of lending capital to nonlegally working entrepreneurs as too high, pub-
lic capital should fill the gap in order to facilitate the upgrading process
and bring local entrepreneurs in conformity with local laws.
Though most ACP governments have recognized the necessity to mobilize
local indigenous entrepreneurship and though small scale business lend-
ing has improved, credit allocation rules in many ACP countries are still
counterproductive for the emergence of local entrepreneurs: Enterprises
which can borrow abroad have every incentive not to do so, whereas for
those enterprises which must borrow domestically banks have no incen-
tive to lend [World Bank, g, p. 286], By easing the access to local ca-
pital market for the latter group the governments would remove one of
the major obstacles to local entrepreneurship.
To conclude, given the colonial heritage of paternalism and state inter-
vention which automatically led to a concentration of- skills inside the
public sector, ACP governments play a major role in economic develop-
ment of their countries. This role has often been - nolens volens - dis-
motivating and paralysing for the emergence of indigenous entrepreneur-
ship because of the size, pay and rules of government. It is rationale
that individuals outside the public sector adjust to the predominance of
this sector either by going into this sector or by circumventing govern-
ment rules and prices when they are not in conformity with the local
demand efficiency conditions.
Whereas ACP governments can easily act as "entrepreneurs" on well-pro-
tected local markets, they fail on the export markets, where a complete
shift of losses to the purchasers is not possible. Governments adhering
to market-oriented stimulants would therefore be well-advised to concen-
trate their skills to guarantee fair chances for everybody to become en-
trepreneur.97
VI. The Role of Multinational Corporations in the Growth of ACP
Exports
1. Foreign Direct Investment and Export Shares of ACP Countries
The growth of exports especially of manufactured goods of a country
depends among other things very much on its technological capability to
produce goods at competitive level of costs of production and on its net-
work of sales and servicing in foreign countries. In both of these fields
ACP countries are generally deficient and could be helped by multina-
tional corporations (MNCs) if suitable conditions are created for the in-
flow of their foreign direct investments (FDI) in these countries.
In many of the newly industrialising countries (NICs) MNCs account for
a considerable share of total manufacturing production and export. In
the case of manufacturing production it ranges between 11 per cent
(South Korea) and 83 per cent (Singapore). In countries like Brazil,
Colombia, Malaysia, and Peru foreign firms produce about two fifths of
the manufacturing goods sold. In the nine countries (Argentina, Brazil,
Colombia, Hong Kong, India, Mexico, Pakistan, Singapore, South Korea)
for whom the data are available, MNCs accounted for 5 per cent (India)
to 92 per cent (Singapore) of their manufactured exports. In the Latin
American countries cited above MNCs are deeply involved in their export
promotion process and are responsible for one third of their exports of
manufactured goods [UNCTC, 1983, p. 136 f. ]. MNCs have not only
information about export markets but also a worldwide network of sales
organisations which can be made available to their affiliates in the host
developing countries for purposes of their exports without additional
initial costs.
The mere presence of MNCs in a country is however no guarantee for a
solid and rapid export growth. The export intensity of MNCs in develop-
ing countries is generally not higher than that of domestic firms (1).
The contribution of MNCs to export growth of their host developing
countries depends on a proper mix of the latter's macroeconomic policies
for industrialisation and foreign trade. In many of today's successful
NICs the foreign firms participated as much in their import substituting
industrialisation as their domestic firms. It was the policy shift towards
export promotion and diversification in these countries which encouraged
the affiliates of MNCs to raise their export/sales ratios. In other coun-
tries especially those with smaller domestic markets such as Hong Kong
and Singapore, foreign firms have gone into export production from the
very beginning. They were attracted there by relatively lower labour
costs and were facilitated by very liberal economic policies of their gov-
ernments.
A comparison of ACP shares in exports and total stock of FDI in LDCs
shows that the former are lower than the latter in most of the countries.
(1) Cohen [1975]; Helleiner [1973]; Lall, Streeten [1977]; Morgenstern
[1976], Newfarmer, Marsh [1981]; UNCTC [1983].00







































































































































































































































Source: IMF [b, 1983]; UNCTC [1983].99
The same result is obtained when ACP's export shares are compared with
their shares in the total number of MNC affiliates in the Third World
(Table 35) (1). The average share of an ACP country in LDCs' exports
amounted to 0.2 per cent in 1978 and it rose to 0.3 per cent in 1980.
The corresponding shares in FDI and MNC affiliates were 0.4 per cent
and 0.6 per cent, respectively (2). Naturally there is no sound reason
why the shares in exports and in the inflow of foreign equity capital
should be equal. Indeed it would be surprising if they were so in many
or all ACP countries. Nonetheless, a positive relation between these two
variables can be expected because in most of the ACP countries a great-
er part of foreign capital had traditionally gone into extractive branches
for export purposes. As the cross-country regression results in Table 36
show this hypothesis cannot be rejected also. Although the variation of
export shares among ACP countries can be explained only up to 23 per
cent in 1978 and 30 per cent in 1980 through the variations of the
shares of FDIs, one can say that they do significantly influence their
exportability. They can therefore as domiciles of the affiliates of MNCs
who do have a better access to world markets than the domestic firms of
these countries improve their export performance by motivating these
foreign affiliates through suitable policies for higher exports. Further,
fresh FDI can be encouraged into export production by means of incen-
tives and establishment of free trade zones as practised by some other
developing countries like Taiwan, South Korea, India, Ceylon and Mexi-
co. The success of free trade zones however depends on the expected
profitability and stability of investment conditions. But countries fol-
lowing import substitution policy - as many of the ACP countries do -
have sometimes no other choice than to opt for free trade zones if they
want to encourage export oriented activities.
2. Importance oi FDI in Total Resource How and Capital Formation
The total stock of FDI in ACP countries in 1978 amounted to about 14.9
bill. US $ which comes to around 17 per cent of FDI in all developing
countries. The average annual flow of these investments during 1978-
1980 in ACP countries was of about 1016 Mill. US $, i.e. about 10 per
cent of the flow of FDI in all LDCs. These figures include Bahamas and
Liberia where most of FDI is likely to be of financial nature on account
of their very liberal tax practices. If they are excluded, the shares of
ACP countries in the stock and flow of FDI in the Third World go down
(1) All the preceding four averages refer to only those countries in
Table 35 for which data on both the export share and the corres-
ponding share in FDI or in total MNC affiliates are available.
(2) The most important exception is Nigeria. It has the highest share in
total exports of LDCs and in total number of affiliates in these
countries. It has the fifth highest share among ACP countries in
terms of shares in stock of FDI. Nigeria's greater participation in
exports in comparison to that in the inflow of foreign equity capital
is solely because of its oil exports.100
Table 36 - Regression Estimates of ACP Shares in LDCs
1 Exports (y),





y = 0.04 + 0.42Xl
(3.52)
y = 0.11+ 0.73x2
(3.44)
x, = ACP share in total FDI in all LDCs in 1978; -x. = ACP share in
total number of MNC affiliates in LDCs in 1980; t-values are given in
brackets and coefficients of x, and x. are significant at a significance
level of one per cent or less.
Source: Table 35; own calculations.
to 13 per cent and 5 per cent, respectively (1). If the FDI in resource
richer countries such as Gabon, Nigeria, Trinidad and Tobago (oil),
Ivory Coast (wood and oil), Jamaica (bauxite), Papua New Guinea, Zaire
and Zambia (copper) are excluded the shares of the remaining ACP coun-
tries in the stock and flow of FDI dwindle down to about 5 per cent and
2 per cent, respectively, confirming the view that poorer countries are
usually not quite attractive for foreign investors. In the poorer ACP
countries, the ratio of FDI to total flow of resources from abroad is also
very low amounting in most of the cases to less than five per cent. Ex-
ceptions are Kenya (8 per cent), Mauritius (13 per cent), Swaziland (7
per cent), Uganda (15 per cent), and Vanuatu (11 per cent).
The share of FDI in domestic investments (DI) is a better criterion to
judge the contribution of foreign investors to economic development of a
host country. In this respect the two resource rich countries, viz.
Papua New Guinea and Zaire, stand in the forefront, having FDI/DI
ratios of 6 and 9 per cent, respectively (Table 37). The high FDI/DI
ratio in Zimbabwe is due more to closer cultural and political relations
with the UK than to natural resources. The ratio of 24 per cent for Li-
beria is an exception and is to a great extent related with financial capi-
tal transfers. The opposite group is formed by Congo, Jamaica, Malawi,
Mali, Mauritania, and Togo, which had negative flows of FDI during the
period of 1978-1980. In most of the remaining countries the contribution
of FDI to domestic capital formation was less than 2 per cent. Judging
on the basis of experience of other countries this was not bad.
Nonetheless, there is still enough scope for raising the contribution of
foreign investors to domestic investments in these countries.
Although most of the statistical information available so far refers to the
period prior to Lome II in which the EC and the associated ACP coun-
tries agreed to promote the EC foreign investments for accelerating the
economic growth of ACP countries and the latter for giving a MFN-treat-
(1) All the figures quoted here are calculated from the data given in
UNCTC [1983] and Table 37.101





































































































































































































































































































(a) Countries for which data for at least four of the columns of this table were available. - (b) 1978.- {c)
Flows reported by the OECD countries. - (d) 27541 affiliates of 19 developed countries (including Spain) in
the Third Vtorld; 1980. - (e) 1980. - (f) More than 100 per cent, because of net outflow of resources in 1979
and 1980.
Source: UNCTC [1983].102
ment to the FDI of all member countries, there is no evidence that the
inclusion of articles 60 to 64 (and Annex IX) in the Lome II agreement
has improved the flow of FDI in the envisaged direction. It is true that
FDI depends on a variety of factors [Agarwal, 1980] and cannot be
simply moved in one or the other direction by means of international
preference and promotion treaties. Nonetheless, it is possible that the
halfhearted welcome to these investments by some of the ACP delegates
during the Lome II negotiations and their concern for national sover-
eignty which found its expression in Annex IX of the agreement did not
contribute to the intensification of EC investment activities in most of the
ACP, countries, especially those which are not endowed with large
amounts of energy and mineral resources.
3. EC Dominance in Direct Investments in ACP Countries
In 1980 ACP countries had about five thousands affiliates of MNCs ac-
counting for about 18 per cent of the recorded number of affiliates in all
LDCs. This is roughly the same as their share in total stock of FDI in
the Third World. Thus there may be no difference between the ACP
countries and the remaining LDCs with regard to the size distribution of
the affiliates of MNCs. More interesting to note is, however, that in two
thirds of the cases the EC affiliates account for four fifths or more of
the foreign firms domiciled in individual ACP countries (Table 37). This
is an indication of strong economic ties between them and the EC. Toge-
ther with the preferential relations they may be acting as entry barrier
for investments from other developed countries and advanced developing
countries such as South Korea (1). This is, however, merely a hypothe-
sis. Though it is supported by some of those countries who could not
invest in ACP countries, it cannot be relied upon without a detailed ex-
amination which is not intended to be done here.
The dominance of the affiliates of MNCs of the EC in ACP countries is in
almost all the cases to be attributed to their former metropolitan coun-
tries. The EC shares in foreign affiliates in Barbados, Guyana, Papua
New Guinea, and Zimbabwe are identical or almost identical to those of
their former metropolitan country, viz. the UK. Further, in 19 out of 32
ACP countries the British multinationals have the largest number of affi-
liates. In Botswana, Kenya, Malawi, Swaziland, Tansania, Uganda, Zam-
bia, and Zimbabwe 70 per cent or more of the foreign affiliates belong to
British multinationals. The French multinationals dominate in eight asso-
ciated countries (Benin, Cameroon, Congo, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Mada-
gascar, Senegal, Togo), the Dutch and the Belgian MNCs each in one
country (Suriname and Zaire, respectively). The predominance of these
three countries in their former colonies in terms of their largest shares
in total number of foreign affiliates is however not as great as in the
case of the British companies. There are only three ACP countries which
(1) Though much of the FDI of South Korea is currently in trading and
construction companies, it can be regarded as being in the first
stage of becoming a bigger foreign investor [Dupont, 1982; Africa
1980].103
form exceptions to the observation that the multinationals from the for-
mer metropolitan countries have the dominating positions in these coun-
tries. The Bahamas and Jamaica belonged to the British empire, but the
American multinationals have the largest number of firms there. In both
the cases the geographical factor appears to have played the most impor-
tant role. Guinea had been a part of French empire but the UK has the
largest share in foreign affiliates there. However, the difference of two
percentage points between British and French shares in Guinea is igno-
rable [UNCTC, 1983].
Many of the foreign firms in ACP countries are vertically integrated in
the activities of their parent concerns. They are either supplying raw
materials from their host countries to the parent firms and their other
affiliates or acting as distributors of their products in the host country
or they are doing both the functions simultaneously. Charts 1 and 2
show a typical capital and trade involvement between a French firm (the
French multinational Pechiney Ugine Kuhlmann (PUK)) and its affiliates
in different African countries (1). A notable peculiarity of this multi-
national is that it participates also in a "multi-multinational" extraction of
bauxite in an ACP country (Guinea) from where aluminium is exported
for further processing not to an industrialised country but to another
ACP country, viz. Cameroon. The trade flows resulting from this pro-
cessing chain comprising all stages up to the final products proved to be
very stimulating for trade among the ACP countries.
Statistical information on intra-firm trade of other EC multinationals in
ACP countries are not available. Nonetheless, its incidence on the for-
Chart 1: Synopsis of Equity Capital Shares of a French Multinational in












































Figures refer to capital participation (percentages) in the affiliates.
Source: Ediafric fa; b].
(1) For a more detailed discussion of characteristics of multinationals
operating in Subsaharian Africa see Masini et al. [1979]; Chudson
[1973].104










eign trade, especially exports, of ACP countries must be very high for
the following reasons:
- Shares of extractive branches including petroleum where the MNC affil-
iates have been traditionally active is rather high in ACP exports.
- Absorptive capacity of domestic markets of most of the ACP countries
is relatively very low. Hence in those cases in which foreign affiliates
are doing some large scale local manufacturing a major portion of pro-
duction has to be exported.
- ACP countries have a high concentration of the affiliates of their for-
mer mother countries. During the colonial period these affiliates were
the prime agents of their foreign trade acting either as raw material
exporters or as importers of finished goods or both. In so far as these
characteristics of the foreign affiliates have not changed since the in-
dependence of the ACP countries, their contribution to the exports of
these countries is likely to be very high.
- The available statistical informations for 1977 indicated that intra-firm
trade accounts for about one third of total exports of parent companies
in developed countries. This share was a little lower for the UK (30
per cent) than for France (32 per cent) and West Germany (35 per
cent). The corresponding figures for imports are likely to be similar
or a little higher. Affiliates of German companies in Argentina, Bra-
zil, India and Mexico sold nearly 60 per cent of their exports to the
parent companies or their affiliates. For the US firms in Brazil and
Mexico in 1972 these shares were as high as 73 per cent and 82 per
cent, respectively [UNCTC, 1983, p. 160 f. ].
Data on sectoral structure of FDI of the EC in the ACP countries are
scarce. A micro study based on legal equity capital of about 700 foreign105
affiliates in 13 francophone African countries showed that in 1975 prima-
ry and manufacturing sectors accounted for roughly one third and two
thirds of total FDI, respectively. More than half of the FDI in manufac-
turing was in textiles, chemical and food industries [Langhammer, 1977].
Other data which are for all the developing countries together suggest
that the investments in primary sectors which used to be the traditional
strongholds of foreign investors in these countries have been declining
(Table 38). The share of these branches in total FDI of the United
Kingdom in LDCs went down from 25 per cent in 1971 to 8 per cent in
1979. This is a direct consequence of the policies of most of the develop-
ing countries to bring their natural resources under their own national
control [Agarwal, 1979]. The incidence of nationalisation has been higher
in these branches than in any other. About seven tenths of all politically
motivated nationalisations and nine tenths of economically motivated na-
tionalisations during 1956 to 1972 in the~ developing countries were of
firms in primary sectors [Agarwal, 1976]. But for the new wave of FDI
in energy sector in the seventies, which was encouraged as a result of
the oil crisis both by the host developing countries and the home devel-
oped countries, the share of primary sectors in total FDI of other EC
countries like West Germany and the Netherlands would have also gone
down considerably further. Most of the ACP countries do not have
enough technical and financial resources to develop their primary indus-
tries requiring considerable investments in physical capital and know-
Table 38 - Sectoral Structure of FDI (a) of West Germany, the Nether-







































(a) Stock of FDI in the cases of West Germany and
























the UK, flow of FDI in the
- (c) Excluding petroleum.
Source: BMWi [various issues]; HMSO [1979]; Kragenau [1982].106
how. They should therefore create an atmosphere of long term stability
and policy predictability to attract foreign capital in these branches,
especially energy.
The share of the manufacturing sector of developing countries in British
FDI has increased. But the African countries have not profited from this
trend. In the case of German and Dutch FDI, this share has rather de-
clined (Table 38). Considering the locational advantages of ACP coun-
tries such as their natural resources, cheap labour and preferential
trading arrangement with the EC there is enough room for attracting the
EC multinationals in manufacturing industries.
If there has not been a large scale inflow of foreign investments in this
sector of ACP countries, then mostly because of smaller size of their
domestic markets and price distortions on their goods as well as factor
markets. These distortions tend to function as taxes on ACP exports. If
these distortions are removed, the favourable options of the Lome con-
ventions would gain considerable importance for potential foreign in-
vestors from the EC.107
VII. Conclusions
The analysis of the role of ACP countries in world trade in general and
in EC trade in particular showed that their performance has been poor in
spite of relatively generous preferences.
Both growth rates of exports and speed of their diversification in these
countries lagged far behind those of non-ACP developing countries. Some
exceptions to this gloomy outcome had more to do with the imponderables
of commodity bonanzas than with the economic policies of the countries
concerned. However, the very few ACP countries where internal econo-
mic policies seem to have given growth impulses in the past are becoming
increasingly vulnerable to crises originating in neighbouring countries
having bad policy management or natural disasters.
Economic stagnation of many ACP countries is reflected not only in their
trade performance, but also in poor growth rates of their incomes. Dur-
ing 1960-1982 they grew economically at a lower rate (2.0 per cent per
year) than even the non-ACP low income countries, who achieved a
growth rate of 2.1 per cent per year. The growth rate of the other non-
ACP developing countries was even higher (3.1 per cent per year).
With this negative background of overall economic performance, the ex-
port-promoting influence of privileged market access had necessarily to
be small. It can improve only if the EC irrevocably removes uncertainties
with respect to its future trade policies not only for the ACP countries
but also for other third countries with whom ACP countries compete for
direct investments. However, this prerequisite of success can only be
labelled low profile therapeutics. Even a free access to the EC market
for ACP countries with constant preference rates in absolute and relative
terms (compared to non-beneficiary countries) will be ineffective if the
incentive system in ACP countries remains as it is now, i.e. against the
opening of markets for goods and factors and in favour of domestic mar-
ket orientation. This is not to say that future preferences free from
safeguard threats and restrictions for CAP products cannot help ACP
countries to see their comparative advantages in a much better way than
now. Such improvements in market access will facilitate a reorientation of
economic policies in ACP countries. But a clear perception of the right
policies and their actual implementation are two different things. The
latter is, of course, the only way to success, but apparently it has not
been given a high priority by all ACP countries.
Such implementation calls for
- trade policy changes, through which import barriers should be lowered
in general and many non-tariff barriers be replaced temporarily with
surcharges;
- changes in interest rate policies, through which interest rates should
be linked to inflation rates and raised in order to promote financial
savings of private households;
- changes in wage policies and wage legislation, through which wage
costs should be reduced to the level of other developing countries in
order to attract investors from abroad;108
- investment policy changes, through which tax holidays and customs
drawbacks for foreign investors should be cut down in order to lower
effective rates of protection and to remove discrimination of those local
investors whose production is not based on imported inputs;
- changes in monetary policies, aiming at a reduction of budget deficits
through expenditure cuts instead of financing them through inflation.
Such policy changes would promote private savings and avoid the
crowding out of private investors;
- changes in exchange rate policies, through which the discrimination of
exports should be removed even at the cost of losing foreign exchange
earnings for primary commodities in the short run.
The focal point of changes in the policies of ACP countries should be the
role of statal and para-statal agencies. This role needs to be reconciled
with the objective of removing one of the crucial bottlenecks of struc-
tural changes in these countries, viz. the lack of entrepreneurial human
capital in the private sector. For historical reasons, which have been
reinforced by current policies, human capital in these countries is con-
centrated in the public sector which goes far beyond the production of
collective goods. Such tasks comprise the administration of state-owned
enterprises in the primary and secondary sector, the control of private
enterprises, and the fixing and monitoring of prices for goods and fac-
tors of production. All these activities lead to a massive state inter-
vention in the economies of ACP countries and draw scarce resources
including human capital into, the public sector, some of which could de-
finitely be used more profitably in the private sector. However, many of
these policies are deeply rooted in ACP countries and it is difficult to
remove them. They are based on closed markets and supported by
strong vested interests which are against the opening of markets. None-
theless, efforts should be made to overcome these difficulties in view of
the gloomy economic prospects of many ACP countries.109
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Source: IMF [a; b].110


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(a) Absolute deviation of the country camiodity shares fran world structure, as follows: S. =
3 2
share of ccrmodity i in total world ex-
ports, - {b) Hirschman index normalized according to the following formula:





1 - | 1/182 , where j = country index; x. = value of exports of commodity i;
x. and 182 = number of products at the three-digit level. Both indices range between zero and 1.0,
the latter representing the most extreme deviation and concentration, respectively. - (c> Second year reported
is 1976. - (d) Third year reported is 1978. - (e) Second year reported is 1975. - (f) Third year reported is
1979.
Source: UNCTAD [a; b].112
Table A3 - ACP Country Shares in Leading Commodity Exports of
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recorded in 1972. - (c) Comncdity groups not re-
cent of developing country exports. - n.e.s. not
Source: UNCTAD [a; b].119
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